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1. Theodor W. Adorno, Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans.
Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 142. This phrase from Adorno’s essay “The
Alienated Magnum Opus: On the Missa solemnis” is also used by Tiedemann as the heading for
the final chapter of Adorno’s unfinished Beethoven fragments, 162–77.
2. Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” in Perpetual
Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1983), 41. It is worth quoting the beginning of this essay in full, for its ideas inform
Adorno’s understanding of middle-period Beethoven: “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from
his self-imposed immaturity [Unmündigkeit commonly translated as “tutelage”]. Immaturity is
the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-
imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use
it without guidance from another. Sapere aude! [“Dare to know” or “Dare to be wise”] ‘Have
courage to use your own understanding!’—that is the motto of enlightenment.”
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Beethoven’s Other Humanism
Daniel K. L. Chua
The eye is the lamp to the body. If your eyes are good, you whole body will be
full of light. But if your eyes are bad, your whole body will be full of darkness. If
the light within you is darkness, how great is that darkness!
—Matthew 6:22–23 (New International Version)
Humanity and demythologization” (Humanität und Entmytho -logisierung):1 According to Theodor W. Adorno, the power ofBeethoven’s music is founded on these twin tenets of En lighten -
ment thought. This idiosyncratic claim is designed to align the composer’s
profile with that of the modern subject, for “humanity and demythologiza-
tion” could be construed as the driving forces of the Enlightenment itself. 
The human who “dares to know” (Sapere aude!), as Kant famously defines
the motto of the Aufklärung, is an agent who demythologizes.2 The “dare”
of this knowing is in breaking every mythical taboo under the banner of rea-
son, turning a being who was once mastered by myth into a subject that mas-
ters itself. Demythologization is therefore the mechanism of Enlightenment
freedom and, as such, forms the very definition of what it means to be human
in the modern world. For Adorno, Beethoven’s humanity issues precisely
from such a definition: by emancipating music from the cultic functions of the
“
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3. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John
Cumming (London: Verso, 1999), xvi.
4. On the theology of displacement see Colin E. Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many:
God,Creationandthe Culture of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1993),1–40.
5. Adorno, Beethoven, 151.
6. Ibid., 169 and 174.
7. Ibid., 163.
8. Kaspar Clemens Zumbusch’s Beethoven Monument (1880) in Beethovenplatz, Vienna,
associates the composer with Prometheus by placing the bound titan, languishing under the vul-
ture’s attack, at Beethoven’s feet. See Alessandra Comini, The Changing Image of Beethoven: A
Study in Mythmaking (New York: Rizzoli, 1987), 352 and fig. 143. For Comini, Zumbusch’s
monument represents “a milestone in [the Beethoven] mythology. . . . Beethoven had become a
citizen-hero: he was both bourgeois and Promethean. He belonged to humanity but came from
and had returned to heaven” (386). On the history of Beethoven’s Promethean scowl, see idem,
“The Visual Beethoven: Whence, Why and Whither the Scowl?” in Beethoven and His World, ed.
Scott Burnham and Michael P. Steinberg, 286–312 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2000).
past, the composer mirrors the human who “dares to know.” Demythologiza -
tion is the process that brings the autonomous subject and an autonomous
music into recognition as brothers of a new humanity.
But ironically, music’s liberation from cult coincides historically with its ele-
vation to the status of cult. Far from secularizing music, demythologization
tends to convert the means into an end, turning a religious art into an art reli-
gion. This dialectical reversal is not so much a failure intrinsic to music as a
condition of the Enlightenment itself. As Adorno points out: “Enlightenment
reverts to mythology.”3 This is because the human, in becoming his own mas-
ter, is no longer made in the image of God but has become a god, creating his
own truths as it demythologizes the past. In theological terms, God is “dis-
placed” by man.4 Similarly, Beethoven’s music “displaces” rather than escapes
its cultic functions: the music acts as the liturgy of secular humanism, perform-
ing the sacrilegious rites of the Enlightenment. What is secular therefore calls
upon the sacred to underwrite its power, and it is precisely this paradox that
Adorno perceives in Beethoven’s demythologizing authority. His “powers of
subjective production,” writes the philosopher, are “heightened to the point
of hubris, to the point where man becomes Creator.”5 His music, by 
“gaining-power-over-[it]self,” is free to resist myth, “to stand firm against
fate,” and to hold out “hope without the lie of religion.”6 It is “the this-
wordly prayer of the bourgeois class, the rhetorical music of the secularization
of the Christian liturgy.” It prays: “Thy will be done,” except that the will it
beseeches is not that of God, but the spirit of man, charged with the task of
making the world as it “should be.”7
Despite its idiosyncrasies, Adorno’s claim is merely an intellectual rehearsal
of a cliché that has shaped the reception of the composer’s music since the
nineteenth century; the Beethoven of “humanity and demythologization” 
is none other than the Promethean Beethoven.8 What is human in the com-
poser is modeled on a mythic figure, whose Enlightenment credentials stem
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from his rebellion against the divine order; Prometheus “dares to know” by
stealing fire from Zeus in order to liberate mankind from tyranny. He is the
myth of demythologization itself, the very symbol of the new humanity for
many Enlightenment thinkers.9 As the theologian Jürgen Moltmann writes,
Prometheus is “the great saint of the modern age.”10 Adorno’s inability to
outmaneuver this legacy points to the long shadow of Prometheus that
Beethoven scholarship has yet to outrun in the twenty-first century. If any-
thing, recent studies have tacitly embraced this figure by updating his name
from “Beethoven Prometheus” to “Beethoven Hero.”11 Indeed, not only is
Prometheus alive today under his alias, he has been formally installed as a
scholarly fixture. The last three decades have witnessed the institution of what
was always a latent prejudice in the literature on the middle-period works: the
“heroic” has escalated from a piece (the Eroica Symphony) to a “phase” and
has now become a “period” replete with two distinct styles—“Heroic Style I”
and “Heroic Style II.”12 So the bias expressed in Adorno’s claim that “the first
movement of the Eroica . . . is really the Beethovenian piece” has now been
made official:13 the heroic is Beethoven’s middle name.
9. David E. Wellbery, for example, reads Goethe’s Prometheus (1775) as an act of speech that
“realizes the emancipatory program of Enlightenment,” freeing man from his delusions through
a critique of religious orthodoxy; see Wellbery, The Specular Moment: Goethe’s Early Lyric and the
Beginnings of Romanticism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 287–345, quote
taken from 293. The Promethean image gathered momentum in the early nineteenth century as 
a figure of defiance, endurance, and humanity, evident, for example, in Percy Bysshe Shelley’s
Prometheus Unbound (1820) and Lord Byron’s Prometheus (1816). Thus it is apt that Beetho -
ven’s Eroica Symphony should allude to the Prometheus myth. However, there is an irony to this
allusion; although Beethoven refers to the titan by quoting his own composition Die Geschöpfe des
Prometheus [The Creatures of Prometheus] in the finale, it is the first movement that is associated
with the demythologizing character of Prometheus and not the last. In fact, the scenario of the
ballet Die Geschöpfe des Prometheus, which was choreographed for the Imperial Court, does not
cast the rebel in the glory and gore of the French Revolution, but as a rather refined figure of the
German Aufklärung, instructing his creatures in the arts and sciences to the strains of an English
country dance. On the relation between the ballet and the symphony see Constantin Floros,
Beetho vens Eroica und Prometheus-Musik (Wilhemshaven: Heinrichshofen, 1978); and Thomas
Sipe, Beethoven: Eroica Symphony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 11–16 and
117–18.
10. Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian
Eschatology, trans. James W. Leitch (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 24.
11. See Scott Burnham, Beethoven Hero (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
12. Lewis Lockwood summarizes this scholarly escalation in “Beethoven, Florestan, and the
Varieties of Heroism,” in Beethoven and His World, ed. Scott Burnham and Michael P. Steinberg
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 36–41. Alan Tyson in “Beethoven’s Heroic Phase,”
Musical Times, 110, no. 1512 (1969): 139–41, coined the term “Heroic Phase” to cover the 
period 1801–4; Maynard Solomon in Beethoven (London: Cassell, 1977), 163–72 and 187–206,
uses “Heroic Period” to designate the years 1803–12; William Kinderman in Beethoven (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995), 86–138, divides the period 1803–9 into “Heroic Style I” and
“Heroic Style II.” There are two recent monographs devoted to the heroic Beethoven, Burn -
ham’s Beethoven Hero, and Michael Broyles’s The Emergence and Evolution of Beethoven’s Heroic
Style (New York: Excelsior, 1987).
13. Adorno, Beethoven, 66.
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Even those who resist the name fall under its spell. Lewis Lockwood, in an
attempt to ground this escalating concept, has limited the meaning of “the
heroic” either to works by Beethoven that contain the word “hero” in the title
(of which there are only two)14 or to those that portray heroes, such as
Egmont and Coriolanus. From this narrow selection of pieces, Lockwood
splits Beethoven’s heroic identity into three character types:
1. the visionary hero who triumphs by the force of will 
2. the stoical hero who resists tyranny through endurance, and 
3. the fallen hero whose fame is monumentalized in death.15 
But far from dispelling the Promethean image, these types can be seen to rep-
resent one hero exhibiting the same defiance under three different circum-
stances: the will to conquer is celebrated in victory, potent in adversity, and
unquenchable in death. They merely underline the Enlightenment spirit that
defies every prohibition in its progress toward truth.16 So Lockwood’s at-
tempt to bind the hero ultimately leaves Prometheus unbound. His overly 
literal endeavor to limit the heroic fails because it misses the Promethean strat-
egy of these works: like the new humanity of the Enlightenment, the de-
mythologizing hubris of the music results in its own mythologization. As
Wagner says concerning the Eroica, Beethoven’s music is not about a hero; it
is heroism itself.17 The escalation of the concept from the particular to the uni-
versal is built into the music. The heroic wants to expand from a single piece
to an entire period. It is a self-canonizing move that guarantees the persistence
of the music by inscribing the hero’s resilience in the work. Or, to put it an-
other way, the hero functions as the “extra-musical” program that sustains the
immortality of Beethoven’s “absolute” music.18
But this immortality is not only programmed into the works. According to
Scott Burnham, Beethoven’s music persists because the heroic is also pro-
grammed into us; the new humanity it proclaims endures as the “moral force”
of our current humanity, as if we were still heirs of the Enlightenment. So it is
14. Namely, the Eroica Symphony and the slow movement of the Piano Sonata in E-flat
Major, Op. 26, “Marcia funebre sulla morte d’un eroe” (“Funeral march for the death of a hero”).
15. Lockwood, “Beethoven, Florestan, and the Varieties of Heroism,” 43.
16. In fact, far from containing the hero, Lockwood’s categories have the effect of illuminat-
ing the extension of the heroic element beyond the middle period, for the “resignation” associ-
ated with the late works is merely another name for the stoical endurance of the hero. Thus the
late period not only contains remnants of the heroic style in, say, the Promethean struggle of 
the Hammerklavier or the triumphant brotherhood of the Ninth Symphony, but is itself heroic in
its acceptance of suffering. “Beethoven hero” turns out to be the master trope of the composer’s
reception from the middle to the late period.
17. See Burnham, Beethoven Hero, xv.
18. See Daniel K. L. Chua, Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning (Cambridge:
Cam bridge University Press, 1999), 149–66. I am using “absolute” here as shorthand for a far
more complex and fluid concept that emerged at the turn of the nineteenth century to designate a
“pure” form of instrumental music.
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.78 on Wed, 3 Sep 2014 22:58:54 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Beethoven’s Other Humanism 575
not aesthetics, claims Burnham, but ethics that ensures the continuing signifi-
cance of the heroic paradigm.19 And as with Adorno, the moral power of the
music resides in its secularization of the Christian liturgy. This power, for
Burnham, is Eucharistic: those who partake of Beethoven’s music experience
the real “presence” of a humanity that originated in what he calls the
Goethezeit, an age in which the self became the center and creation of knowl-
edge.20 The particular context in the revolutionary ego of German philosophy
may no longer be relevant, suggests Burnham, but the music, as an act of re-
membrance, makes present a defining moment of humanity which we have
not yet outlived: Beethoven sounds out the Promethean spirit in us.21 As
Burnham writes: “Within the context of the Goethezeit, and, by extension, of
the entire modern era, the presence within the heroic style amounts to a theo-
phany in the Age of Self.”22 Beethoven makes real the simultaneous act of 
demythologization and remythologization that is our humanity. The fact that
we still call on the heroic Beethoven to mark the endurance of the human
spirit, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the atrocities of 9/11,23 is testimony
to its living presence. So Adorno is not alone: “humanity and demythologiza-
tion” are still the twin tenets of faith for those who believe in Beethoven today.
If Beethoven’s Promethean defiance can tear down the walls of tyranny in
Berlin, if its twin tenets can rebuild the twin towers of New York, then it is
likely that its ethics will continue to speak for the epochal events of the future.
The hero will survive as he is programmed to do so. The question is whether
this demythologizing hero is an adequate definition of humanity and its ethi-
cal task in the twenty-first century. “Must we always call upon Beethoven to
attest to [the morality of the human endeavor]?” writes Esteban Buch.24 After
19. See Burnham, Beethoven Hero, 148 and 151.
20. As Brian Hyer notes in his review of Beethoven Hero in Music Theory Spectrum 20 (1998):
135, the unacknowledged “presence” behind the book is probably George Steiner’s Real
Presences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
21. Although Burnham draws on German transcendental philosophy to construct Beetho -
ven’s heroic self, the political and biographical contexts also conspire to shore up the composer’s
Promethean image; the ideals of the French Revolution, the Messianic figure of Napoleon, and
the ailing Beethoven “seiz[ing] fate by the throat,” are as much models for the heroic style as
Kant’s transcendental subject, Fichte’s self-positing ego, or Hegel’s absolute I. Different com-
mentators simply select different plots to contextualize the same figure: Burnham’s philosophical
account, Adorno’s political reading, and Solomon or Lockwood’s biographical explanations, for
example, merely reenforce one another to justify Beethoven’s Promethean spirit.
22. Burnham, Beethoven Hero, 150.
23. To celebrate the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, Leonard Bernstein conducted
the Ninth Symphony on both sides of what was formerly a divided city. Notably, the word
“Freude” was replaced by “Freiheit.” Twelve years later, on what would have been the anniver-
sary of Adorno’s ninety-eighth birthday, the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York
collapsed in an act of terror. In London, the last night of the Proms had to be hastily repro-
grammed; once again, the finale of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony was wheeled out to galvanize
the human spirit to press forward “joyfully on his way to triumph” like the hero of Schiller’s text. 
24. Esteban Buch, Beethoven’s Ninth: A Political History, trans. Richard Miller (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2003), 267.
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all, the failure of the Enlightenment to procure its promises has led to an ex-
tensive critique of this heroic subject and its Promethean spirit, not least by
Adorno himself. The prayer “Thy will be done” did not bring heaven on earth
for Adorno but the reality of hell in which “Auschwitz” is merely “a
metonym” for human society.25 That Beethoven and Auschwitz should coex-
ist in the same breath is, of course, an outrage;26 that it is thinkable, however,
indicates how high the ethical stakes are. No other composer can fall from
such a height because no other composer has had so much invested in the
ethics of “humanity and demythologization.”
So is it worth keeping faith with this Beethoven? If, under critique, his
heroic mantle is wearing a little thin, exposing the failure of his moral creden-
tials, then may be it is time to ditch the heroic image altogether. After all, 
“humanity and demythologization” is not the only definition of the human in
Beethoven. The heroic does not necessarily represent the composer; in fact,
such a narrow focus may suppress his nonheroic identities.27 So would it be
possible to uncover another humanism beneath the Promethean mantle—an
ethics without heroes?
If Beethoven’s Promethean values were merely a matter of the music’s
moral psychology, then one could follow Lockwood’s cue and confine the
heroic to a few “characteristic” works. If it were a matter of the music’s recep-
tion, then the heroic could be relegated to a work’s discursive history, leaving
the music relatively immune from the hero’s moral failures. Adorno’s point,
however, is that demythologization is not merely a trope in Beethoven; it 
is what Beethoven does to music. Music’s very emancipation is a result of de-
mythologization and is therefore a testament to the new humanity. The ethics
is the music itself. The moral psychology of the Eroica Symphony may drama-
25. J. M. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), 373.
26. The correlation between the human and inhuman in Beethoven is not an idiosyncratic
twitch in Adorno’s dialectics. The relation, for example, is explicit in Anthony Burgess’s A
Clockwork Orange. The most recent, if somewhat banal, variation on this theme occurs in Peter
Segal’s film Get Smart in which the villain, Siegfried (Terence Stamp), plants a bomb in the Walt
Disney Concert Hall to be triggered by the sound of the Ninth’s final chords. Violent readings of
the Ninth Symphony go back as far as Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, where the mixture of
Dionysian revelry and Schopenhauerian philosophy masks a horrific ritual of individual annihila-
tion. Curiously, Nietzsche may not have been too far from one of Beethoven’s conceptions of 
the work: in an early idea for the Ninth Symphony, the composer described the last movement as
“a festival of Bacchus.” In this light, freedom and joy take on a more violent and debauched con-
notation. See Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Birth of Tragedy” and “The Case of Wagner,” trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), 37–38. Beethoven’s note concerning his pro-
jected symphony (Bonn Beethoven Archiv Bsk 8/56) is quoted by many scholars including
Alexander Wheelock Thayer, in Thayer’s Life of Beethoven, rev. E. Forbes (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1967), 888; and Barry Cooper, in Beethoven (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 265.
27. See Nicholas Mathew, “Beethoven and His Others: Criticism, Difference, and the
Composer’s Many Voices,” Beethoven Forum 13 (2006): 148–87.
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tize the ethics, the discourse may disseminate its meaning, but ultimately it is
the music’s “absolute” status that defines its moral force.28 Beethoven’s ethics
is not merely a topic but a technique. So any reevaluation of Beethoven’s hu-
manism will have to start from the inside out, from an ethics inscribed in the
very mechanism of the music’s self-proclaimed autonomy. After all, the
Promethean hero is not defined by his external acts but by an inner strength
that pits itself against a prevailing order. Heroic autonomy is a violent,
monadic force. And it is only in the analysis of this internal pressure that one
can gauge the ethics of “humanity and demythologization” that lies behind a
work’s monadic identity.
The Formal Law of Freedom
Monads, according to Gottfried Leibniz, are irreducible soul-like substances,
each divinely programmed as a unique “mirror of the universe.” Yet despite
this preestablished harmony, monads do not interact; they are ontologically
independent from each other. Their glistening surface merely hides a darkness
within. Or as Leibniz puts it, monads are “windowless.”29 These objects, shut
in autotelically upon themselves, are analogous to musical works for they, too,
are “windowless,” states Adorno.30 Works are blind inasmuchas they are im-
pervious to the outside world. Yet it is this in-sight that constitutes their au-
tonomy; they are oiled from within by what Adorno calls “the formal law of
freedom” (das Formgesetz der Freiheit), an internal logic liberated from exter-
nal obligations.31 This “formal law” is music’s demythologizing act. In the
same way as “Enlightenment,” to use Kant’s definition, “is man’s release from
his self-incurred tutelage” through the exercise of reason alone,32 so music,
through its internal laws, liberates itself from its subservience to the disciplinary
functions of church and court. Beethoven, the “revolutionary bourgeoisie,”
28. On such character types, see Richard Will, The Characteristic Symphony in the Age of
Haydn and Beethoven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
29. Gottfried Leibniz, Monadology, in Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld,
and Monadology, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company,
1993), 263 and 252.
30. In his Introduction to the Sociology of Music, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury
Press, 1976), 211, Adorno writes: “The relation of works of art to society is comparable to
Leibniz’s monad. Windowless—that is to say, without being conscious of society, and in any event
without being constantly and necessarily accompanied by this consciousness—the works of art,
and notably of music which is far removed from concepts, represent society.” In this way, explains
Adorno elsewhere, “the relationship of the work and the universal becomes the more profound 
. . . the more it becomes infatuated with its own detached world, its material, its problems, its con-
sistency, its way of expression. Only by reaching the acme of genuine individualization . . . does
the work become truly the bearer of the universal.” Adorno, “Theses Upon Art and Religion
Today,” in Notes to Literature, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991–92), 2:297.
31. Adorno, Beethoven, 42.
32. Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” 41.
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.78 on Wed, 3 Sep 2014 22:58:54 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
578 Journal of the American Musicological Society
claims Adorno, represents “the prototype of a music that has escaped from its
social tutelage and is esthetically fully autonomous[.] . . . In it . . . the essence
of society, for which he speaks as the vicar of the total subject, becomes the
essence of music itself.”33 Music’s monadic blindness turns out to be the living
mirror of society.
However, this newly enlightened music is not as free as its “formal law of
freedom” may suggest; music’s autonomy is merely the discipline of the exter-
nal world “turned inwards,” writes Adorno. The outward order from which
music frees itself is reconstituted as an internal law so that its aesthetic self-
determination is simultaneously “reflected [and] wrenched from its immediate
social purpose.”34 The music mirrors the contradiction of a self-positing sub-
ject that internalizes the very discipline from which it emancipates itself in 
order to be human. Being human, therefore, has inhuman consequences. Thus
music’s “formal law of freedom” is simultaneously its latent law of oppression.
The details of this inversion from freedom to oppression can be determined
from the very words that form the concept, words that are equally a synec-
doche of Beethoven’s heroic image as they are of music’s monadic autonomy:
form, law, freedom.
Form. If, as Adorno claims, the musical monad secularizes the past as an inner
discipline, then the ritual its “formal law” internalizes is the sacred 
violence of purification, a separation that either discards the Other as “un-
clean” or sets it apart for total destruction.35 “The purity of form,” claims
Adorno, “is modelled on the purity of the subject”; the ego’s self-constitution
is an ascetic act that achieves it monadic state by “divesting itself of the non-
identical.”36 Similarly, music’s “formal law of freedom” is purely formal 
because it preens itself of foreign bodies, expelling everything that cannot be 
integrated into its structure. After all, “without rejection there is no form,”
states Adorno.37 And since form is the locus of music’s newly discovered au-
tonomy, such music is necessarily inhumane in its pursuit of freedom. Indeed,
“the purer the form and the higher the autonomy of the works,” writes
Adorno, “the more cruel they are.”38
33. See Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, 209–10, repr. in Beethoven, 43; transla-
tion modified.
34. Adorno, Beethoven, 42.
35. As Adorno writes in ibid., 172–73: “The holiness of music is its purity from dominance
over nature; but its history is the inevitable development of that dominance as it became master of
itself.”
36. Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. R. Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1997), 162.
37. Ibid., 144.
38. Ibid., 50. Although form, according to Adorno, should follow the “feel” of the material
(Formgefühl as opposed to Formgesetz), discovering and molding its singularity, given its Platonic
heritage, it is always in danger of imposing its universal purity upon the material it shapes.
“Formalistic classicism commits an affront,” writes Adorno. “Precisely the beauty that its concept
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Law. Exclusion, then, is the basis of music’s formal function; music’s legal
function—its “formal law”—merely enforces these structural boundaries by
policing freedom with a violence that coerces the internal material to obey the
form through various types of contractual controls that align form with con-
tent. Just as Kantian autonomy is based on a legal subject that exerts its rights
over nature through laws created within itself, so music assumes a legislative
function, holding time to account with obligations that order the tonal and
thematic material. These contractual laws drive an economy that binds the
monadic shape into a dense, impenetrable form in which every particular must
add up to the totality; harmonic disjunctions must be closed within the system
and thematic loose ends tied up in order to resolve any seemingly anomalous
event. In so doing, the law appears to justify the form as the result of its inter-
nal processes, as if the form had been reproduced out of subjective freedom.
Freedom. However, the freedom of the formal law is not the process of the law
per se, as if it were some kind of self-winding mechanism; rather its freedom 
is found in the giving of the law; or, as Ludwig Tieck puts it, music “prescribes
its own laws to itself.”39 In other words, music’s inner law is dictated by an
outer freedom. In fact, this ability to be simultaneously inside and outside the
system is championed by Burnham as the essence of Beethoven’s heroic style;
the music emanates a “telling presence” that narrates the form as an external
agent while enacting its own internal procedures; the deed, which is a conse-
quence of the law within, is directed by the sovereignty of the will without.40
So, despite its inner discipline, music, inasmuch as it gives the law to itself, is
free because it is outside the internal rule it imposes; this act is not subject to
the formal law of exclusion, but is the exception which enables the form to ex-
clude anything that is not for itself. Indeed, this logic of exception, according
to the philosopher Giorgio Agamben, is the very structure of sovereignty:41
glorifies is sullied by the manipulative, “composed” violence of its exemplary works. All that is im-
posed and added secretly gives the lie to the harmony that domination undertakes to produce. . . .
Reconciliation as an act of violence, aesthetic formalism, and unreconciled life forms a triad”
(ibid., 48). On the relationship between form (rationality) and mimesis (nature) see Morton
Schoolman, “Toward a Politics of Darkness: Individuality and Its Politics in Adorno’s Aesthetics,”
Political Theory 25 (1997): 63–65. On Beethoven’s expurgatory voice, see Mathew, “Beethoven
and His Others.”
39. Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder and Ludwig Tieck, “Symphonien,” in Phantasien über
die Kunst, für Freunde der Kunst (Hamburg, 1799), in Werke und Briefe von Wilhelm Heinrich
Wackenroder (Berlin: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1938), 254. Wackenroder and Tieck are para-
phrasing Kant’s definition of genius (“Genius is the talent [natural endowment] which gives the
rule to art”), transferring the act of creative legislation to the musical work itself. See Immanuel
Kant,Critiqueof Judgement (1790), trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon,1969), 168.
40. Burnham, Beethoven Hero, 144.
41. See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). Also see note 267. Agamben’s notion of
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music’s freedom is therefore modeled on the subject as ruler, giving credence
to Adorno’s claim that “the autonomy of the art-work has its source in het-
eronomy, much as the freedom of the subject arose from lordly sovereignty.”42
So in summary, music’s “formal law of freedom” hides an inhumane order
behind its humanism: its inhumanity can be defined through the three terms
that make up the concept:
Form: the purity of exclusion
Law: the necessity of contractual control
Freedom: the external will that ordains an internal order
The “formal law of freedom,” then, is an autonomy of pure force, the unim-
peded will of a legal subject whose sovereignty is maintained through what it
excludes and what it binds in its process of self-formation (Bildung). 
The Sublime Monad
The “formal law of freedom” may constitute the monad’s internal forces, but
it is its impact on the outside world that displays its ethical effect. According to
Kant, form, in contrast to the formlessness of the sublime, ought to be beauti-
ful through the harmonious play of its internal processes; but because music’s
freedom has taken the form of the law its “outward effect” on Adorno is one
of fear—“what Kant called our awe before the sublime.”43 The moral law,
states Kant, is a force that overwhelms the subject’s sensibility with its intima-
tions of the infinite;44 similarly for Adorno, music’s formal law causes the indi-
vidual to “shudder” before its totalizing processes.45 Adorno clearly has
Beethoven in mind as the exemplar of the monadic law, focusing in particu-
larly on the heroic Augenblick:46 “When the sublime becomes a totality” he
writes, “it is a moment [Augenblick] of transcendence.”47 The Augenblick is a
“the state of exception” arises from the work of the political theorist, Carl Schmitt, for whom the
state of emergency (the exception) was not so much an extreme example of sovereign rule as its
fundamental category; see Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty
(1922), trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
42. Adorno, Beethoven, 42.
43. Ibid.
44. In particular, Kant draws attention to the sublimity of the second commandment con-
cerning the ban on making graven images: like the monad, the sublime law is blind in that its
power cannot be represented. See Kant, Critique of Judgement, 127.
45. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 245.
46. See Adorno, Beethoven, 42. In this fragment [107], which has been the basis for my for-
mulations on the “formal law of freedom,” Adorno writes: “re. Beethoven?—but in general, of
the utmost importance.” As is commonly the case, Beethoven’s heroic works function as the 
paradigm for music in general.
47. Ibid., 42.
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moment of form for Adorno, a revelation of the totalizing force that binds the
particulars dynamically together as a product of freedom.48 So “when the sub-
lime becomes a totality,” what is revealed by the music is the law of autonomy
itself; the external will that governs the inner forces suddenly transcends the
material. As a “sublime totality,” this moment is the intersection of fear (the
sublime law) and form (the autonomous totality), and so reveals the discipli-
nary force behind the rule of freedom. The equation between violence and 
order was already acknowledged as early as 1810 in E. T. A Hoffmann’s cele-
brated review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, where the motivic asceticism of
the material generates the prolific power of the sublime:49 the tighter the in-
ternal network the more terrifying the form.50 Far from manifesting itself 
in the incalculable vastness of nature as described by Kant, the sublime in
Beethoven’s heroic works achieves its effect through an obsession with formal
procedures. It is reason posing as absolute power, crushing the individual be-
neath its logic. Thus Beethoven’s “symphonic authority,” writes Adorno, al-
ways threatens to suck the recipient into its internal processes as a kind of
“ritual reception . . . within an evolving whole.”51
So instead of consuming the hero’s real presence as Burnham’s Eucharistic
encounter celebrates, for Adorno, the individual is swallowed whole by the
music. Freedom, then, should be the last concept on the philosopher’s lips 
as he cowers before this voracious totality. But it is precisely this fear of being
absorbed that Adorno regards as the “real function” of music’s autonomy: the
sublime totality engenders a “resistance” within the recipient.52 Freedom is
not found in the music’s formal procedures but in the subject’s reaction
against them. The Fifth Symphony, for example, leaves Hoffmann in a state of
unquenchable yearning for the infinite, as if the sublime were a catalyst for the
subject’s own becoming.53 After all, in Kant’s aesthetics, the overpowering
negations of the sublime are supposed to awaken a moral power within the
48. On the heroic Augenblick see Daniel K. L. Chua, “The Promise of Nothing: The
Dialectic of Freedom in Adorno’s Beethoven,” Beethoven Forum 12 (2005): 23–24; and Naomi
Waltham-Smith, “Adorno’s Augenblick and the Ethics of Late Beethoven” (PhD diss., King’s
College London, 2009).
49. As Agamben points out, the freedom of the sovereign involves the paradoxical union of
justice and violence—the “force of law” lies behind the law of freedom; see Agamben, Homo
Sacer, 30–38.
50. See E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony,” Allgemeine musikalis-
che Zeitung, 4 and 11 July 1810, cols. 630–42 and 652–59; repr. with some changes (1899),
trans. in E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writings: “Kreisleriana,” “The Poet and the Composer,”
Music Criticism, ed. David Charlton, trans. Martyn Clarke (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), 234–51. Also see Chua, Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning, 181–82.
51. Adorno, Beethoven, 119.
52. Ibid., 42.
53. See Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony,”AMZ, and in E. T. A.
Hoffmann’s Musical Writings, 238–39; see a related discussion in “Beethoven’s Instrumental
Music,” in E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writings, 98.
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subject. So when Adorno shudders before this music, he, like Hoffmann be-
fore him, discovers a moral force inside himself; in resisting its power, the mu-
sic’s “formal law of freedom” strikes revolutionary “sparks from [his] soul,”54
in the same way that the French Revolution, for Kant, is sublime, promising a
freedom that is truly human, even if its reality is truly horrifying.55 So the mu-
sical monad is not only an internal reflection of the subject’s autonomy, it ac-
tually reinforces it, causing a sublime reaction as the listening subject re-forms
itself against the overwhelming presence of the music as a kind of counter-
monad. In the heroic Augenblick, one becomes human through a confronta-
tion with a monadic force, a struggle that reenacts in the recipient the
Promethean image of humanity associated with Beethoven’s heroic works.56
Being human, it seems, is a reaction, a freedom experienced in relation
to the sublime monad. But since the moment of contact is one of mutual ag-
gression, it is questionable whether the relation is truly human(e). After all,
monads, because they are “windowless,” cannot relate by definition. Or to 
put it another way: the heroic Augenblick has no eyes; it is oblivious to the
outside world. At first, this may appear contradictory. How can an Augen-
blick be blind? How can its visionary light radiate darkness? But the failure to
relate stems precisely from its claim to see, for the Augenblick is equivalent to
what the ethical philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas calls an “egology of synthe-
sis”; it is a seeing that accompanies the “I think” of the modern self as it 
gathers all alterity into a “synchrony of representation.”57 The monadic mo-
ment of self-presence is one of total vision, a panoptic glory that shimmers
over an impervious surface. This visionary glance, epitomized by the blaze of
C major that ignites the finale of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, blinds itself by
the very light through which it claims to capture the world. Its glory is merely
the solipsism of the hero’s own reflection, sucking all it sees into the black hole
54. Adorno, Beethoven, 42.
55. See Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 349; Jean-François Lyotard, “The Sign of History,” in
Post-Structuralism and the Question of History, ed. Derek Attridge, Geoff Bennington, and
Robert Young, 162–80 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Christopher
Norris, What’s Wrong with Postmodernism: Critical Theory and the Ends of Philosophy (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 208–21.
56. For an elaboration of the ethics of a sublime withstanding in Adorno’s aesthetics (albeit
from a Habermasian perspective), see Albrecht Wellmer “Adorno, Modernity, and the Sublime”
in Endgames: The Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity, trans. David Midgley (Cambridge MA: MIT
Press, 2000), 155–81. Michael Spitzer in Music as Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven’s Late Style
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 256–80, applies Wellmer’s ideas
to the late works of Beethoven, which he regards as an expression of the “allegorical sublime.”
Also see note 63.
57. Emmanuel Lévinas, “Diachrony and Representation,” in Entre nous: On Thinking-of-the-
Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993), 161. The italics in “representation” are added. The essay also appears in idem, Time and
the Other, and Other Essays, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1987), 97–120.
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of his totalizing presence. This “mechanism of ‘pathic projection,’ ” writes
Adorno, which “determines that those in power perceive as human only their
own reflected image, instead of reflecting back the human as precisely what is
different” is at the heart of the revolutionary subject.58 The “I,” as Johann
Gottlieb Fichte describes it, knows itself “as an eye which rests on itself and 
is closed into itself. It sees nothing outside of itself, but it sees itself.”59 Such
windowless light, by its very inaccessibility, is the sublime that renders the
heroic monad invincible and impenetrable.
And if monads are nonrelational by nature, sublime monads are doubly so.
For as the theologian John Milbank argues, the sublime is a nonreciprocal aes-
thetic: “The sublime explicitly refuses reciprocity. . . . Insofar as the invisible
sublime arrives in the visible, it loses itself in a merely negative kenosis.
Inversely, where the visible offers itself to the invisible [the sublime], this is 
utter self-sacrifice.”60 The sublime either empties itself of meaning as some 
ungraspable force under which we shudder or absorbs the Other in its asser-
tion of power. It either blinds the visible or is blind to it. Thus without eyes,
the sublime monad is ultimately inhuman for it cannot return the gaze of an
Other. Indeed, the sublime, as an aesthetic of fear, finds pleasure precisely in
what is nonrelational; it creates division in the face of difference and defiance
instead of love, pandering to what many commentators regard as the patho-
logical condition of our existence: “the fear of the Other” (John Zizioulas), or
more accurately, “a horror of the Other who remains Other” (Lévinas).61 The
58. Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N.
Jephcott (London Verso, 2002), 105.
59. J. G. Fichte, Nachgelassene Schriften 1800–1803, part 2 of Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, edited by Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jakob (Stuttgart-Bad Cann -
statt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1962–), vol. 6 (1983), p. 169; the translation is from Wellbery, The
Specular Moment, 60.
60. John Milbank, “Beauty and the Soul,” in Milbank, Grahan Ward, and Edith Wyscho -
good, Theological Perspectives on God and Beauty (Harrisburg PA: Trinity Press International,
2003), 7.
61. John D. Zizioulas, “Communion and Otherness,” Orthodox Peace Fellowship’s Oc -
casional Paper No. 19 (Summer, 1994), http://incommunion.org/articles/older-issues/ 
communion-and-otherness (accessed 16 March 2009); and Emmanuel Lévinas, “La trace de
l’autre,” in En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 1970; 1st ed. 1949),
188. Recent studies have revived the sublime as a way of renewing communication, of which
Wellmer’s “Adorno, Modernity, and the Sublime” is the most pertinent. To understand the sub-
lime as nonrelational contradicts Wellmer’s recasting of modern art as an expression of communi-
cation in its sublime “act of withstanding the negativity of the world”; by resisting the abyss of
meaninglessness brought on by the collapse of metaphysics, modern art mirrors the fragility of the
Habermasian communication model, and so provides “a direct experience of [the subjects’]
power to articulate, to communicate, to fashion their world” (172). The sublime in modern art
thus retains its Beethovenian hubris; it is a Promethean act against the gods at a time when the
gods have vacated the realms of meaning; it speaks as a heroic survivor. But inasmuch as Wellmer’s
aesthetic sublime presupposes a world that needs to be conquered, the sublime “relation” over-
comes the other at the expense of reconciliation.
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sublime, as the aesthetic category that accompanies the monad, merely ex-
presses the formal law of exclusion at the heart of the subject’s sovereignty. 
In a sense, Adorno knew that. His famous reversal of Hegel’s definition of
truth—“the whole is the false”—registers the delusion of monadic self-
completion. Yet Adorno does not abandon the monadic work of art; instead
he keeps faith with its moment of emancipation by pursuing its internal
processes “until the inherent consequence of the [work] is transformed into
[its] own criticism.”62 If the sublime monad is blind because it claims to see,
then the truth of its lie can only be seen by blinding its vision. Myopia is the
condition of its truth.63 What Adorno demands of art, then, is the revelation
of its own monadic darkness in order to “illuminate a meaningless world.”64
Late Beethoven to late Schoenberg is Adorno’s abridged history of this dialec-
tical withdrawal into “absolute oblivion.”65 And it is by driving the isolation of
the monad to the point of alienation in the formal laws of the Schoenbergian
tone-row that art reflects the “horrors of history,” forming an opaque mirror
in which society might recognize itself.66 The “shocks of incomprehension”
that accompany new music are a result of this revelation: they testify to both
the inaccessible truth of a windowless art that has “taken upon itself . . . the
darkness . . . of the world” and a world that is blind to own darkness.67 So de-
spite the dialectical negation of the monad from blinding light to illuminating
darkness, the work of art ultimately retains its nonreciprocal posture; it still 
has no eyes. Alienation, not relation, is Adorno’s answer to the failure of 
humanism—as if the blind could lead the blind.
Beethoven’s late works are the first to register the inhumanity of this blind-
ness by pursuing the “formal law of freedom” to the point of self-negation.68
Buckling under their own pressure, the motivic and tonal structures lose the
rigor of their internal order to reveal the exclusionary violence formerly
masked by the aesthetic of purity. The formal law reveals its unfreedom
through its formal collapse. By following an internal logic of disintegration,
these late structures often betray the message of the work, particularly when its
62. Theodor W. Adorno, in Philosophie der neuen Musik, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and 
Wesley V. Blomster as Philosophy of Modern Music (London: Sheed and Ward, 2003), 133.
63. Or as Adorno puts it in Minima Moralia, 182: “micrological moral myopia.” Not only
does blindness undergo a dialectical reversal in Adorno’s aesthetics, the sublime also inverts its 
effect, revealing the frailty of nature within the subject; see note 103.
64. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 133.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 132.
67. Ibid., 133. Also see Daniel K. L. Chua “Drifting: The Dialectics of Adorno’s Philosophy of
New Music,” in Apparitions: New Perspectives on Adorno and Twentieth-Century Music, ed.
Berthold Hoeckner, 1–17 (New York and London: Routledge, 2006); and Schoolman, “Toward
a Politics of Darkness,” 57–92.
68. In the late style, writes Adorno, the “formal law is manifest . . . precisely in reflection on
death” (Beethoven, 125).
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humanism is announced with the monumental voice of the hero; the epic pro-
portion with which Beethoven makes the declaration of peace in the Missa
solemnis, for example, or the politics of joy in the Ninth Symphony no longer
generates the inner discipline that pulls the material into a taut, tensile form;
instead, their formal disintegration divulges the “dark side” of human free-
dom. At times, this inhumane element is not even sublimated as a structural
undertone; in the finale of the Ninth Symphony, what Agamben would clas-
sify as “a state of exception” in which sovereignty is established by the law of
exclusion, is explicitly portrayed; all are included in the brotherhood of joy
with the exception of its Other—“he who cannot rejoice.”69
Whoever has the great fortune to enjoy mutual friendship,
Whoever has taken a loving wife, let him join us in celebration!
Yes! Even he who calls only one single soul his own in all the wide world!
But he who cannot rejoice, let him steal weeping away from this group.70
Schiller’s poem states this political order seemingly without embarrassment,
but Beethoven sets the injunction for the Other “to steal away” with a coun-
terintuitive dynamic that illumines the ban that gives joy its sovereignty (see
Ex. 1). The emphatic cadence that normally punctuates the “joy theme” 
with a loud flourish closes with a rather awkward “diminuendo—piano,” as if
the music needed to hide an anomaly at this point (mm. 280–284 and 288–
292).71 The theme’s embarrassment is, in one sense, merely word painting—
the music steals quietly away—but in doing so, the sudden hush brings out
the contradiction between the inclusiveness of joy and its necessary exception
by impeding the dynamic flow. So for all its heroic noise, the celebration of
brotherhood in the theme harbors a quiet blush that gives away its lie, for the
humanism it champions treats its Other as less than human. 
But for Adorno, it is the Missa solemnis that represents the shrine of human
alienation. In this work, the state of exception is so radical that the excluded
69. If, as Agamben contends in Homo Sacer, the structure of sovereignty has at its heart the
inclusion of what it simultaneously excludes (the illegal exception), then the inclusion of the 
exception in Schiller’s text founds the sovereignty of joy; joy abandons those whom it is bound to
protect as subhuman in the name of humanism. Also see note 267.
70. Wem der grosse Wurf gelungen, / Eines Freundes Freund zu sein, / Wer ein holdes
Weib errungen! / Mische seinen Jubel ein! / Ja—wer auch nur eine Seele / Sein nennt auf dem
Erdenrund! / Und wer’s nie gekonnt, der stehle / Weinend sich aus diesem Bund.
71. For further discussion of exclusion in the Ninth’s message of harmony see Nicholas
Vazsonyi, “Hegemony Through Harmony: German Identity, Schiller, and the Ninth Symphony,”
in Sound Matters: Essays on the Acoustics of German Culture, ed. Nora M. Alter and Lutz
Koepnick, 33–48 (Oxford and New York: Berghahn, 2004); and Peter Tregear, “The Ninth after
9/11,” Beethoven Forum 10 (2003): 221–32. Also see Adorno’s comments on this passage in
Beethoven, 32–33 and 212; Adorno draws attention to the “affirmative force with which
Beethoven hammers [the idea of humanity] home” (212); the forte passages that surround the
lines are just as guilty in their insistence as the “diminuendo—piano” blush.
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Example 1 Beethoven, Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, finale, mm. 284–292 (Chorus)
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Other is none other than Beethoven himself.72 The composer has been ban-
ished from his own music. Beethoven’s “greatest work,”73 as he himself adver-
tised it, betrays its “greatness” with a disconcerting reticence, as if this were
another blush, hiding by instinct rather than intention a secret that under-
mines Adorno’s faith in Beethoven’s power to solve the “riddle of human-
ity.”74 The heroic Augenblick, notes the philosopher, derives from a composer
whose power “is founded on humanity and demythologization,” but “the
Missa’s formal law,” is a curtailment of that power, rendering the mass
strangely impotent, as if “it cannot say what it . . . sets out to say”: Beethoven
has simply “eliminated himself” to produce a monumental blank.75 Instead of
the dynamic impulse that generates the totality from the friction of the motivic
particulars, the Missa is constructed out of arbitrarily imposed blocks of
anonymous material. “The autonomous subject,” writes Adorno, “which
knows itself to be capable of objectivity in no other way, cedes to heteron-
omy.”76 Beethoven’s internal law of freedom is now subject to external laws
that resemble the archaic order from which his music had emancipated itself,
except that this order is not a reactionary return of the disciplinary function of
religion, as the mass setting would suggest, but a secular abstraction. In effect,
the heroic monad has excluded itself, leaving a power vacuum for an outside
authority to take hold of the present in the guise of a religious anachronism.
With its formal law purified of the subject, the objectivity of what remains is
the god to whom Beethoven has sacrificed his music. And Adorno is uncertain
whether he can pray Beethoven’s demythologized prayer for the future of 
humanity. 
72. “Hardly anyone who did not know [the Missa],” observes Adorno in Beethoven, 139,
“could tell by listening to the work that it was by Beethoven.” “It lacks all unmistakably Beetho -
venian characteristics.”
73. In a letter to Verlag Schott of 10 March 1824, Beethoven writes “I consider [the Missa
solemnis] my greatest work.” Beethoven, Sämtliche Briefe, ed. Emerich Kastner, rev. Julius Knapp
(Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 1975), 706.
74. Adorno, Beethoven, 8. In fact, it was on account of the Missa solemnis that the philosopher
abandoned his Beethoven project altogether. In the preface to Moments musicaux Adorno 
writes: “The [essay] ‘Alienated Masterpiece’ . . . forms part of the complex philosophical work 
on Beethoven projected since 1937. It has yet to be written, mainly because the author’s efforts
have continually foundered on the Missa solemnis. He has therefore tried at least to set out the 
reasons for these difficulties, and to state the question more precisely, without presuming to 
have answered it.” Translation is from Adorno’s Beethoven, 235n249 (slightly altered). Original: 
“ ‘Verfremdetes Hauptwerk’ . . . gehört in den Komplex des schon seit 1937 projektierten
philosophischen Werkes über Beethoven. Bislang kam es nicht zur Niederschrift, vor allem, weil
die Anstrengungen des Autors immer wieder an der Missa Solemnis scheiterten. Er hat darum
wenigstens versucht, den Grund jener Schwierigkeiten zu benennen, die Frage zu präzisieren,
ohne sich anzumaßen, er hätte sie etwa schon gelöst.” Adorno, Moments musicaux, in Musi -
kalische Schriften IV, vol. 17 of Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1982), 12.
75. Adorno, Beethoven, 142, 139, 151, and 139.
76. Ibid., 152.
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The Human
What is it to be human? This is the question that Adorno asks Beethoven to
answer. Despite falling to the thrall of the Beethovenian hero, there are mo-
ments in which Adorno refuses to give the heroic monad the monopoly it 
desires over humanism. There exists another vision, one that contradicts the
blind autonomy of the hero and his myopic withdrawal into hermitic dark-
ness. Very occasionally, Adorno sees it. Or rather, it is the other way round:
the vision sees Adorno. The music has eyes, he claims. And although this gaze
is left almost inarticulate in his fragments on Beethoven, Adorno sees in these
eyes the secret of what it is to be human: “In what does the expression of the
human manifest itself in Beethoven? I would say, in the fact that his music has
the gift of sight. The human is its gaze.”77 This “gaze” is clearly indebted to
Walter Benjamin’s concept of “aura,” a phenomenon that endows a work of
art with “the ability to look back at us.”78 As such, this gaze is far more star-
tling than the hollow sockets that haunt Adorno in Beethoven’s late works, for
the “auratic individuality” of an object demands a returning glance.79 What is
human expresses itself only in relation to another. And by “an Other” Adorno
means another so different that s/he is almost nonexistent; these eyes open
like windows onto a human being long forgotten by the modern subject. In
this gaze, the subject is disarmed of the instrumentality with which it habitu-
ally “violate[s] the imponderably delicate aura of the other,” as Adorno puts
it.80 Or in the words of Lévinas, “the face of the other” puts the self “into
question.”81 The “totalizing look” of the hero is suddenly surprised by the 
alterity of a face that precedes his initiative and eludes his autonomy, demand-
ing a response from one who normally only commands in the name of free-
dom.82 It is the subject’s ability to avert this gaze, or perhaps to stare through
77. Ibid., 164.
78. Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt,
trans. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana Press, 1968), 184; translation slightly modified. Benjamin
uses the term to denote both the authenticity of artworks and the uniqueness of an individual per-
son. The latter is particularly relevant since Benjamin associates this aura with the gazing face cap-
tured in early photographs: it represents the human, a presence that will vanish in later
photography, which not only swallows the subject into the background but attempts to make in-
dividuals appear identical. Thus “aura” evokes a human being whose existence is barely present
under the destructive conditions of modern life. For a summary of Benjamin’s use of the term see
Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Benjamin’s Aura,” Critical Inquiry 34 (2008): 336–75; for an explo-
ration of the relation between Adorno and Benjamin on photography see Shierry Weber
Nicholsen, Exact Imagination, Late Work: On Adorno’s Aesthetics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1997), 181–225.
79. On “auratic individuality” see Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, 111–20.
80. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 182. 
81. Lévinas, “Diachrony and Representation,” 168.
82. See Emmanuel Lévinas, Alterity and Transcendence, trans. Michael B. Smith (London:
Athlone Press, 1999), 22–32, and 4.
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it, that constitutes the inhumanity of modern society. “For Adorno, this ex-
change of looks” comments J. M. Bernstein, “of seeing and not seeing, of 
being seen and disregarding this seeing” lies at the core of the subject’s moral
disintegration.83 What is human, then, is not disclosed in the eyes, as if it could
be appropriated by the subject, but is realized in our relation to the gaze. It
takes at least two to be human.
So if Beethoven’s music has eyes, if “the human is its gaze,” then our very
being, to return to Lévinas’s phrase, will be “put into question” by the music.
Perhaps this was Adorno’s original motivation for his unfinished project on
the composer: Beethoven seemed to be staring him in the face. In one of his
earliest notebooks, just before the first jottings on the Beethoven monograph,
Adorno scribbled to himself: “We do not understand music—it understands
us . . . Just when we think ourselves closest to it, it speaks to us and waits with
sad eyes (mit traurigen Augen) for us to answer.”84 These “sad eyes” initiate 
a reversal. Our investigation of music suddenly turns on “us”; it is about “us”;
“it understands us”; it puts “us” into question. Moreover, our knowledge of
music is inversely proportional to our self-knowledge; the more we under-
stand it, the less we understand ourselves. Its alterity turns the “I am” of mod-
ern self-affirmation into a question: “Who am I?” And it is our inability to
answer the question—our inability to be human—that leaves those eyes wait-
ing for the reciprocity that will turn alienation into relation.
Indeed, Rolf Tiedemann speculates that Adorno’s failure to complete his
Beethoven project stems from our incapacity to be human after Auschwitz.
How could the “societal monad” as Adorno calls us,85 answer those sad eyes
“in an age when the ‘better worlds’ of which Florestan sang were no more
than a blood-stained mockery of this present world, beside which Pizarro’s
dungeon appears idyllic”?86 Initially, Adorno had wanted his Beethoven
monograph “to resolve the riddle of humanity,”87 but in the end, given the
blindness of society to its own inhumanity, he could only affirm the riddle’s 
insolubility as the answer.88
But the failure of the Beethoven project was not merely the result of an 
untimely history. The problem lies deeper, entangled within Adorno, in the
inability of his very thoughts to think the human. Adorno’s failure, then, is
also the failure of philosophy itself. Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music simply
could not live up to the philosophy it aspired to in its title, for within the
83. See Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, 72. On this “manic gaze” that cannot
see the human except as a thing, see Adorno, Minima Moralia, 105.
84. Adorno, Beethoven, xi; translation slightly modified. 
85. Theodor W. Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz” in Critical Models: Interventions and
Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 201.
86. Adorno, Beethoven, xii.
87. Ibid., 8.
88. In Aesthetic Theory, 122, Adorno writes: “The solution of the enigma amounts to giving
the reason for its insolubility, which is the gaze artworks direct at the viewer.”
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philosophical tradition Adorno inherited, the question of personal ontology is
actually an impossible one. According to the theologian John Zizioulas, the
question “Who am I?” has no answer in Western philosophy; “Ancient Greek
thought [is] essentially ‘non-personal,’ ” he writes.89 And if there is no answer,
then the gaze that Adorno glimpses in Beethoven will be left unreturned, des-
tined for alienation and not relation. Indeed, the gaze itself would be sus-
pended as an eternal riddle—“Who am I?” Yet the three components in the
question outline a metaphysics of personal identity without which humanity
ceases to be human. The first component, the “who,” is a “call for definition,”
states Zizioulas; it is the self-assertion of a consciousness that must articulate
its identity against a given world. The second component, the “am,” is a state-
ment of being; it is the desire to transcend the transience of existence, to 
secure the need to be in the face of non-being. Finally, the component “I,” is
“a cry for particularity”; it is an assertion of otherness, a claim to a uniqueness
that is both unrepeatable and nontransferable—“many things ‘are’ but no one
else is me.”90 It is the last component, the “I,” that turns the metaphysics of
being into a metaphysics of the particular. And this is precisely the impossible
thought of Western philosophy that Adorno wants to think in Beethoven. In
Platonic and Aristotelian thought, true being cannot be attached to the partic-
ular. Being is eternal; the particular is transient and partakes of metaphysics
only as a by-product of some totality. So in Plato, the particular finds its true
identity in the universal; the particular fades away but the form in which it 
participates remains. Form is, therefore, eternal. In Aristotle, the particular is 
a classification of nature. If “the individual [exists only] within a genus,” as
Lévinas points out, then the “I” is always replaceable;91 the class survives its
ephemeral status only as a member of a species. Nature is, therefore, eternal. 
Although Adorno operates critically against both tendencies, conflating the
totalizing and classifying habit as forms of “identity thinking,” he nevertheless
succumbs to the universal in typically Greek fashion: the particular’s existence
is played out as tragedy. Greek tragedy, writes Zizioulas, confirms its philoso-
phy: the cosmos “does not exist for the sake of man, but man exists for its sake.”92
The premise of Adorno’s thought is one in which the individual is enslaved by
the external order and is ultimately annihilated by the totality. In Horkheimer
and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, reason reverts to myth, turning his-
tory into fate. The same narrative underlines Adorno’s history of music;93 the
89. John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (London:
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985), 27.
90. John D. Zizioulas, “On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood,” in
Persons, Divine and Human, ed. Christoph Schwöbel and Colin E. Gunton (Edinburgh: T & T
Clark, 1991): 34–35.
91. Lévinas, “Diachrony and Representation,” 168.
92. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 32.
93. Adorno regarded Philosophy of Modern Music as “an extended appendix” to the Dialectic
of Enlightenment; see Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, xiii–xiv, and Chua, “Drifting,” 5.
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heroic Beethoven, writes Adorno, is “the metaphysics of tragedy—the totality
of negations as a position, the affirmation of what is”; the late works are sup-
posed to unmask this “tragedy as illusion,” but they still end up as “catastro-
phes” in which “the destruction of the particular” takes center stage.94
Thus the vision of humanity that Adorno perceives in Beethoven’s eyes
merely questions the tragedy with an alterity that suspends the total domina-
tion of fate, but it cannot constitute a true metaphysics of the particular. This
music, he writes, “is perceived only as something vanishing from sight. As
Eurydice was seen.”95 So the closest his philosophy of music gets to making
eye contact with the particular is in the gaze between Orpheus and Eurydice,
in which the act of reciprocity destroys its very possibility. The human—the
impossible thought—is sustained only by that which fades away: an apparition.
And if the truth of the particular for Adorno is its enduring transience, then
this merely turns the question “Who am I?” into “What am I?” (I am tran-
sient); and the “what” is precisely that which is not particular, for transience is
a transferable and repeatable quality shared by the many.
In effect, Adorno’s vision of transience reduces a person to a thing—from
“who” to “what.” This is particularly telling in Adorno’s cosmic metaphor of
“stars” that appear fleetingly in Beethoven’s works. These “humanized
star[s]” are like eyes that twinkle above the totality;96 they are extraneous par-
ticulars whose flicker rhymes with “the imponderably delicate aura of the
other.”97 And yet, if the eyes are constellations, the cosmic analogy of them
closing in death and reopening in nature seems too close to Platonic and
Aristotelian thought to affirm the ontology of the particular.98 Ultimately, the
94. Adorno, Beethoven, 176, 126, and 177.
95. Ibid., 6; italics added. On this motif in Adorno see Daniel K. L. Chua, “Adorno’s
Metaphysics of Mourning: Beethoven’s Farewell to Adorno,” Musical Quarterly 87 (2004):
530–32.
96. Adorno, Beethoven, 170. Adorno’s aesthetic theory aligns art’s permanent “image” with
the social totality against which the “star” or its kindred spirit the “apparition” falls or fades as a
fleeting spectre of otherness; this “instant of appearance” [Augenblick des Erscheinens] within the
image demonstrates a metaphysics of alterity where the nonidentical rises above the identical
(Aesthetic Theory, 80).
97. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 182.
98. Music’s inorganic afterlife in nature is already evident in some versions of the Orpheus
myth; after Orpheus’s decapitation, Apollo places his lyre among the stars. Or as Adorno himself
writes: “If the idea of artworks is eternal life, they can attain this only by annihilating everything
living within their domain” (Aesthetic Theory, 52). This connection between death and starlight is
particularly evident in a quote from Louis Aragon which Adorno uses to preface his essay
“Schubert,” in Moments musicaux (18): “The whole useless body was invaded by transparency.
Little by little the body turned to light. The blood shone. The limbs, in an incomprehensible ges-
ture, became rigid. And the person was no longer anything but a sign among the constellations.”
By fixing non-identity among the stars, Adorno is merely re-inscribing the basic premise of west-
ern metaphysics and therefore the problem of personal ontology. Beethoven, incidentally, was
drawn to the starry heavens above; see, for example, William Kinderman, “Beethoven’s Symbol
for the Deity in the Missa solemnis and the Ninth Symphony,” 19th-Century Music 9 (1985):
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human being is not a human being for Adorno but an adjunct to being added
as “something extra-human.”99 Indeed, the thrust of Adorno’s aesthetics in
which the mimetic rationality of art hopes to reconcile nature to the abstract
rationality of the Enlightenment tends to return a humanity that defines itself
against nature back to its origins in nature.100 Admittedly, it is not nature as
such but its evanescent, almost inimitable beauty that art imitates. But natural
beauty as the nonidentical trace in art’s mimetic impulse can fall prey to that
Teutonic desire to merge with the Earth,101 a trope that manifests itself in the
Primal Unity of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and the death-wish of Mahler’s
music. After all, doesn’t Adorno describe Eurydice’s farewell as “the tears of
one whom the earth has reclaimed”?102 It is this “gesture of return,” he
writes, that “characterizes the expression of all music.”103 Adorno’s twist on
metaphysics, then, is that the permanence of nature has become transient—
hence the stars are always falling stars. The particular is ephemeral because na-
ture decays; its earthly return is therefore a reconciliation with nature as death.
The appearance of nature as the Other is simultaneously the spectacular disap-
102–18; and Berthold Hoeckner, Programming the Absolute: Nineteenth-Century German Music
and the Hermeneutics of the Moment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 12–50
and 224–37. On Orpheus’s inorganic afterlife see Daniel K. L. Chua, “Untimely Reflections on
Operatic Echoes: How Sound Travels in Monteverdi’s L’Orfeo and Beethoven’s Fidelio with a
Short Instrumental Interlude,” Opera Quarterly 21 (2005): 577.
99. Adorno, Beethoven, 170. Also see Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 39.
100. Adorno, in Beethoven, 173, puts this idea succinctly: “Nature, having become the ego,
opens its eyes as ego (not in the ego, as its regressive part) and becomes aware of itself qua ego 
as nature. This moment—that is, not the breakthrough of nature but its remembrance of 
otherness—is closest to reconciliation and also to lamentation”; this modified translation is from
Hoeckner, Programming the Absolute, 237. Although the “non-identical” for Adorno implies the
possibility of an Other human, his exploration of this idea in his aesthetic tends not to be personal;
rather he locates alterity in natural beauty, which means that the individual is ultimately reducible
to nature and death.
101. Adorno writes: “Natural beauty is the trace of the nonidentical in things under the spell
of universal identity” (Aesthetic Theory, 73). Thus the star, as an object of nature, is “a promise of
goodness. The gesture of nature as good” (Beethoven, 170). On natural beauty and non-identity
see Aesthetic Theory, 71–78; on mimesis and nature see ibid., 110–12, 133–34, and 167–69. 
102. Adorno, Beethoven, 184. Aptly, this reference to the Adagio of Beethoven’s Sonata, 
Op. 31, no. 2, does not concern only Eurydice’s tears but also the stars; see the parallel passage on
Opus 31, no. 2, in Beethoven, 170. 
103. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 129. These tears refer to an automatic release from
the eyes of modern music; just as an involuntary blush recalls our instinctive, pre-subjective state
in nature, so these musical tears of a cold and objective modernity are a natural release not too
different from the distant twinkle of a star. Also see a parallel passage in Aesthetic Theory, 276, that
associates these tears with a sublime self-awareness: in the face of nature, the subject, contra Kant
and the heroic Beethoven, becomes aware of its own natural essence which “breaks the arrogance
of his self-positing”; thus “freedom awakens in the consciousness of its affinity with nature.” Or as
Wellmer puts it: “Modern art is the remembrance of nature in the subject, tied to the power of a
subject to withstand the experience of its own natural condition” (“Adorno, Modernity, and the
Sublime,” 166).
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pearance of the particular. Or as Berthold Hoeckner puts it: “Only at the mo-
ment of its fall does the star shine brightest.”104
Inasmuchas Adorno reduces the person to nature, there is something nec-
essarily cold about these starry eyes despite their evanescent glow. In fact,
Adorno’s philosophy is colder than the mere indifference of nature, for na-
ture’s transience is at the beautiful end of the mimetic spectrum in which the
particular is suspended. The instrumentality of modern reason that distances
the world as an object of dissection stands at the other end; it too is a mimesis
of nature. Instrumental reason, write Adorno and Horkheimer, is the “mime-
sis of death” in nature,105 but this time it results in a permanent death brought
on by the chill of Enlightenment thought. Instead of the ephemeral passing of
the subject, this demise is the “Eternal Recurrence” of the same;106 it is the
rigor mortis of fate, of myth, of the living dead. As Simon Jarvis explains, for
Adorno the mimesis of nature in the magical rituals of primitive man is
[an] attempt to become like nature in order to ward off what is feared [in na-
ture]; but what remains to be feared when instrumental reason has apparently
brought a feared nature under culture? Death is an inextinguishable reminder
of the nature in culture. The whole nexus of self-preservatory thought and 
action . . . mimics death, strives to become inorganic, object-like in its attempt
to ward off death.107
Thus the mimesis of nature is both the “Other” of Enlightenment reason
and, in its “repressed form,” an identification with it.108 The particular is torn
between two deaths, frozen between the eternity of one and the passing of the
other. The coldness of this dialectical deadlock, for Adorno, is an attempt to
outwit fate by dying to death, stalling the tragedy through the negation of 
the negative. It is as if, in the subzero temperatures of this philosophy, the 
particular is cryogenically preserved in art until a cure for humanity’s coldness
is found. In Beethoven’s late works, the friction generated between the two
deaths is allegorized as the collision between the objective debris of classical
conventions (stasis) and the fiery hollows of the escaping subject (transience).
It causes sparks that illuminate the splintered landscape. Such a moment is 
redemptive, for Adorno, because these sparks “estrange the world, reveal[ing]
it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear
one day in the messianic light.”109 But this light cannot banish the coldness
from the deaths in which the particular is ensnared; it illuminates it “harshly”
as a revelation of darkness.110 Thus according to Adorno’s thermometer, the
104. Hoeckner, Programming the Absolute, 23.
105. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 57; translation modified.
106. Theodor W. Adorno, “Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait,” in Quasi una Fantasia: Essays
on Modern Music (1963), trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1992), 152.
107. Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1998), 31.
108. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 187.
109. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247.
110. Adorno, Beethoven, 126.
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temperatures in these works fluctuate feverishly between a frozen landscape
where “subjectivity has petrified” and fleeting fires “ignited by subjectivity as
its strikes the walls of the work in breaking free.” This “ignition between ex-
tremes” inaugurates the truth of music in the shivering climate of modernity.111
So whatever warmth is conjured up in the glimmers of ghosts and stars in
Adorno”s hearing of Beethoven, it cannot thaw what he calls “the coldness of
the societal monad.”112 There is a chill in the eyes of humanity because cold-
ness for Adorno constitutes the fundamental principle of modern society. It
“permeates everything”;113 the stoical hardness of Kantian ethics, the political
and aesthetic theories of mutual disinterest, and ultimately the atrocities of
Auschwitz are all manifestations of it.114 As Adorno writes: 
. . . if people were not profoundly indifferent toward whatever happens to
everyone else except for a few to whom they are closely bound and, if possible,
by tangible interests, then Auschwitz would not have been possible, people
would not have accepted it. . . . [The “lonely crowd” is] a banding together of
people completely cold who cannot endure their own coldness and yet cannot
change it.115
This chill is so pervasive that even Adorno’s method of critique cannot but
collude with the same “coldness that is the fundamental principle . . . of bour-
geois subjectivity”; the “reflective coldness of the theorist” cannot escape the
guilt of that which it decries.116 Hardness is the condition of a critique in hard
times. And, ultimately, the humanity that Adorno sees in Beethoven’s eyes is
no different; the eyes become cold. In fact, he specifically aligns Beethoven’s
gaze to a moment of critical resistance in the Ninth Symphony. What Adorno
sees is a steely vision engaged in some kind of staring contest with fate. These
eyes pierce through the recapitulation of the first movement, where the power
of the principal theme resonates within the recipient as a sublime “shudder” of
overwhelming fear;117 the sheer volume and rhythmic insistence affirm the re-
turn of the opening as fate.118 By imposing the “recurrence of the same,” the
recapitulations in Beethoven’s heroic symphonies often “assume the crushing
force of repression” for Adorno, “of an authoritarian ‘That’s how it is.’ ”119
With the Ninth, this force is particularly terrifying. The reappearance of the
sotto voce opening as a cacophonic blaze of D major is almost an exaggeration
111. Ibid.
112. Adorno, “Education after Auschwitz,” 201.
113. Ibid., 202.
114. See Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, 400–406.
115. Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz,” 201.
116. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, 398. “The detached observer,” writes
Adorno in Minima Moralia, 26, “is forced to develop a coldness indistinguishable from that of
the bourgeois.”
117. Adorno maintains that Beethoven’s recapitulations are “aesthetically dubious,” the
“moment of untruth, of ideology” (Beethoven, 17).
118. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 245.
119. Adorno, Beethoven, 44.
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of the minor-major trajectory so typical of Beethoven’s heroic forms; in this
struggle from darkness to light, what was suppressed in a mysterious haze at
the beginning is now revealed as an act of such violence that some commenta-
tors have compared this recapitulation to attempted rape and ritual murder.120
And yet, for Adorno, the “shudder” of the recoiling subject in such moments
of structural necessity produces a counterforce that stares fate in the face; in
Kantian fashion, it shakes the “I” into an awareness of an ethical sublimity
within itself that can withstand the limits imposed by an authoritarian world.
And it is this reaction that is embodied in the theme in the reprise of the Ninth
Symphony; its recapitulation does not merely reinforce the “pure representa-
tion of necessity,” which Adorno hears at the beginning, but resists it.121
But how? Adorno does not say, but perhaps it is due to an emerging sense
of difference in the music. The return of the theme is not as monolithic as its
force makes out, but is split by an internal struggle that turns the moment of
structural synthesis into one of resistance. This is significant, for at the start of
the symphony the original theme drives ineluctably toward the singular, as-
serting its tonal identity at its point of closure with the raw power of an un-
harmonized arpeggio blasted out by the orchestra (Ex. 2a, mm. 16–21).122
Even the initial fragments that hover nebulously over the opening measures
are monophonic in essence; the apparent harmony of bare fifths is not some
separate entity that complements the falling motifs, but is merely the result 
of a single outline that encompasses the melodic surface and bass support 
(Ex. 2b); they are one and the same, forming a kind of a unison haze.
At the recapitulation, however, this outline, despite its terrifying volume, is
undermined by recalcitrant bass notes that generate strange harmonies, pre-
venting the melodic force above from grounding itself below. The bass line
shifts its footing in a highly unorthodox manner that flouts the laws of “good”
voice leading: F–B –A–F  (mm. 301–315). Perhaps this is because it isn’t
supposed to be “good”; rather the bass line forms a rogue element. The initial
F, for example, turns the open fifths of the theme (D–A) into a triumphant
D-major triad, but far from colluding with this “crushing force of repression,”
it quite literally up-roots the sonority so that it teeters precariously as a first in-
version chord; the F is foreign to the structural weight that the theme claims
for itself. The purpose of these peculiar bass notes, it seems, is to produce a
sense of melodic stasis by warping the harmonies around the theme; instead of
120. See Robert Fink, “Beethoven Antihero: Sex, Violence, and the Aesthetics of Failure, or,
Listening to the Ninth Symphony as Postmodern Sublime,” in Beyond Structural Listening? Post -
modern Modes of Hearing, ed. Andrew Dell’Antonio, 109–53 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2004); and Susan McClary, Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 128–29.
121. Adorno, Beethoven, 15.
122. In this example, the exception to the unharmonized sound are the trumpets which rein-
force the percussive blows of the timpani; the timpani are obviously limited in terms of pitch, re-
sulting in the anomaly, but Beethoven has hidden the limitation by ensuring that the downbeats
remain unharmonized.
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Example 2 Beethoven, Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, first movement, exposition: 
(a) mm. 16–21; (b) mm. 1–5 
(a)
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replicating the original dominant-tonic motion, the theme stagnates, as
though it were caught within a harmonic force-field with D suspended inside.
Thus the recapitulation is locked in a staring match. And to underline the stale-
mate, at the climactic moment in which the entire orchestra states the D-minor
arpeggio in bare octaves, the bass refuses to align itself with the forces above it.
Rather, it pushes upward in counterpoint against the downward trajectory of
the arpeggio (Ex. 3).
The return of the initial theme, then, is Promethean; it has the “gesture of
someone standing firm,” writes Adorno.123 With its harmonic and contra -
puntal defiance, the immediate force of the music is distanced by a gaze that
holds back “the crushing force of repression.” “The gaze of the work of art,
which is manifested in this theme, and wants, through its meaning, to be
gazed upon in turn, has something withstanding, resistant about it.”124
Against the “Eternal Recurrence” of fate, the subject must continue to be, to
affirm the “I am” of being, its freedom to exist.125 The “Who am I?” of the
particular grates against the “Thus it is” of fate.126
123. Adorno, Beethoven, 163.
124. Ibid., 15.
125. Ibid., 152.
126. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 245. The idea of the subject’s sublime reaction to the sublime
is more clearly exemplified in Adorno’s description of the slow movement of the Ninth Sym -
phony: “The gesture of standing firm is nowhere more grandiose than in the 12/8 section of the
Adagio of the Ninth Symphony, where the fanfare of the full orchestra is answered, alone, by the
first violins, but forte [m. 151]. The weak instruments stand up to the preponderant power, be-
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Example 3 Beethoven, Symphony No. 9 in D Minor, Op. 125, first movement, recapitulation,
mm. 314–321
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In the margin of his notes, Adorno reminds himself to refer to a page in his
copy of Hegel’s Aesthetics where he has scribbled the words “standing firm”;
Hegel’s text at this point is underlined three times:
[Art has] the mitigating effect of making the human being conscious of what,
otherwise, he merely, directly is. For now the human being contemplates his im-
pulses and inclinations; and whereas, otherwise, they carry him along without
reflection, he now sees them outside himself and begins, since they confront
him as something objective, to exercise his freedom in regard to them.127
For Adorno, Hegel’s text suggests that art can never be a unilateral movement
of fate, for its gaze always creates a bilateral distance, a “dualism . . . between
itself and the beholder” that allows for critical leverage and discursive reflec-
tion.128 The recapitulation of the first movement of the Ninth Symphony per-
forms this reflective resistance within the music itself as a sublime act; it states
that in music fate is never blind. In defying the totality, the gaze of the Ninth
testifies to a subject that can “exercise [its] freedom” through what Michel
Foucault would call an act of “self-crafting.”129 The rogue element reinvents
its footing as a bass line that stands outside the laws of voice leading in the
same way that a subject can react creatively against the formal norms of soci-
ety; the deviant and disjunct process of “self-crafting” that undermines the re-
capitulation defines the music’s freedom, but this freedom exists only within
the limits of the unfreedom imposed upon it. It is in this sense that the sub-
lime awakens the sublime within the subject.130 By objectifying this form of
moral resistance, the music invites the self to contemplate and re-form itself;
the music “understands us.”
But, of course, by prying open what is essentially a sublime monad, Adorno
discovers a gaze that can only resist and not a gaze that can relate to an Other.
This confrontational gaze may create the critical gap of negative dialectics but
it will not open the reciprocal distance necessary for humanity to find its be-
ing. And since its critical resistance is merely a reaction to the force inflicted
upon the subject, the gaze may inadvertently rehearse what it opposes and 
become blind in the process. In fact, Adorno’s theory of mimesis demands
this. “Does not music perhaps stand firm against fate precisely in becoming
fate?” asks Adorno. “Is not imitation the canon of resistance? . . . Does not
gaining-power-over-oneself, freedom, lie only in imitation, in making-oneself
similar?”131 But similar to what? After all, “standing firm” is the political 
127. Quoted in Adorno, Beethoven, 205n46.
128. Ibid., 15.
129. See Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press,
2005), 18–19.
130. Adorno relates this experience of “standing firm” to Kant’s “dynamic sublime” in the
Critique of Judgement. See Beethoven, 169. 
131. Adorno, Beethoven, 169. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, 9–10, Adorno and Horkheimer
describe mimesis as the imitation of what is feared in nature in order to ward off its threat. “The
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posture of the revolutionary hero. “The stoical body of the Revolution,”
writes Dorinda Outram, “is about the definition of an autonomous self
through an . . . impermeable, controlled body”;132 it is a monad, a non-body,
an armor-plated subject that denies its senses for a hard and impervious sur-
face, indifferent to the world it opposes. Inasmuch as “standing firm” hardens
the body to become a non-body—indeed, a non-person—it is also “a mimesis
of death,” glazing over those “sad eyes” of Beethoven until they appear as 
inorganic and cold as nature herself.133
The Eyes of Alterity
Something human has died between the “sad eyes” that first arrested
Adorno’s attention and the resistant gaze that left his book on Beethoven in-
complete. Those “sad eyes” are still waiting for Adorno to answer the ques-
tion “Who am I?” because his philosophy of the particular is aligned with a
metaphysics of nature which is by definition not a metaphysics of the particu-
lar at all. Perhaps it is to the philosopher’s credit that he left his Beethoven
project unfinished. How could the Beethoven he believed in resolve “the rid-
dle of humanity” if all Adorno can offer is the critical gaze of dialectical nega-
tion extended into the steely vision of the Ninth Symphony? As he himself
admits: “I have said that the Fifth and Ninth [Symphonies] stand firm
through looking-in-the-eye. Is that still too little?”134 So is there another way
to recover a gaze in Beethoven’s music that is truly human, a gaze which, if 
returned, would bestow to the particular the ontological significance it 
desires?
Musical eyes are not literally objects embedded in the score as textual refer-
ences or pictorial depictions, just as for Lévinas the “face” of the Other is not
literally a face that can be perceived; that would merely capture the Other
sound of fate knocking at the door” in the Fifth Symphony, for example, does not “demonstrate
fate”; rather, the movement that emerges from the opening measures is deployed “to cancel, 
preserve and elevate [aufheben] those portentous beats” (Beethoven, 166).
132. Dorinda Outram, The Body and the French Revolution: Sex, Class, and Political Culture
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 156 and 81.
133. Indeed, Adorno describes the hero as a pose—“the Roman as a bourgeois in fancy
dress” (Beethoven, 79): it is not real, but a mask added onto the person, and in this sense the per-
son is not a being but a role. If this is the case, then it probably has its origins in Greek thought,
where, as Zizioulas suggests, the term “person” is associated with the actor’s mask in Greek the-
ater. The heroic classicism of the bourgeois borrowed from the Roman Republic similarly stems
from the Roman concept of “persona” which plays a legal and social role within the collective; 
the freedom and identity of the Roman persona is only guaranteed by the state—the totality. In
this sense, Adorno’s critique of heroic Beethoven is not far from its origins in Roman thought. See
Adorno, Beethoven, 79 and 190; and Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 31 and 34–35.
134. Adorno, Beethoven, 169.
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through the appropriation of the subject’s vision.135 Rather, musical eyes refer
to moments that cannot be assimilated, where music appears to disclose the
human, as if these eyes were portals into the depth of a human being whose
“delicate aura” indicates the inviolable and irreducible existence of a person.
But why demand the impossible vision of a listening eye or “speculative
ear”?136 What is there to see in the “sonority” of the face?137 Precisely noth-
ing. To return the musical glance is to see what the modern world has made
invisible. In Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s terms, such vision is a “voyance” that
“renders present to us what is absent.”138 Or as Lévinas writes: “Ethics is an
optics,” but, unlike the clarity of Newtonian optics, it is a “spiritual optics,” “a
vision without image, bereft of the synoptic and totalizing objectifying virtues
of vision.”139 It is visual in that it perceives the Other, but musical in that it
cannot grasp the Other.
Of course, music, according to Adorno, has its own “synoptic and totaliz-
ing vision” in the Augenblick of Beethoven’s heroic works. By capturing time
as a spatial instant, the music mimics the eye/I of the modern subject; it 
masters reality through the “synchrony of representation” that seizes time in
the present tense of an “I think.”140 By contrast, Beethoven’s “gift of sight”
ought to cancel out this synchronic gaze.141 After all, the heroic Augenblick
cannot by definition be a “gift of sight” inasmuchas it seizes time as a moment,
for a gift has to be given and not taken. Rather, music’s donation of vision
should give time for the invisible to present itself rather than seize time to 
135. “The face,” says Lévinas, “is not the color of the eyes, the shape of the nose, the ruddi-
ness of the cheeks, etc.” Emmanuel Lévinas, Is It Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel
Lévinas, ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 208.
136. Adorno derived the term “das spekulative Ohr” from Kierkegaard: see Theodor W.
Adorno, “Schwierigkeiten,” in Impromptus: Zweite Folge neu gedruckter musikalischer Aufsätze, in
Musikalische Schriften IV, vol. 17 of Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), 290.
137. Lévinas, “Diachrony and Representation,” 172. 
138. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader:
Philosophy and Painting, ed. Galen Johnson, trans. ed. Michael B. Smith (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1993): 132.
139. Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 23, 78, 23. Also see Lévinas’s critique of
“seeing” in “Diachrony and Representation,” 159–68 passim.
140. Lévinas, “Diachrony and Representation,” 161; italics added. In music analytical terms,
this grasp of temporality is inadvertently reflected in Kevin Korsyn’s identification of the
Schenkerian Ursatz with the Kantian “I think”: “A self is a prolongation of the ‘I think’; a com -
position is a prolongation of an Ursatz. The organic composition, then, is a correlate of Kant’s
cognitive subject; the Ursatz is the transcendental consciousness of the piece, its ‘I think.’ ” Given
that Schenker’s inspiration for the Ursatz stems from his work on the music of the heroic
Beethoven, the analogy is fitting. See Korsyn, “Schenker and Kantian Epistemology,” Theoria 3
(1988): 35. On Schenker’s Ursatz and the heroic Beethoven, see Burnham, Beethoven Hero,
89–102.
141. Adorno, Beethoven, 164.
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re-present the unseen in its retinal grasp. Thus the paradox of seeing-what-
is-heard is designed to contradict the instantaneous instrumentality of
Enlighten ment observation.142 Instead of a Vor-stellen that positions an object
in front of the subject’s gaze, seeing what is heard (the unseen) allows an 
auratic Other to “show itself [as other] by giving itself.”143 The ethical task 
of this donation, then, is to break the visual economy of modern existence;
music’s gift is a counter-moment to the contractual circle that literally con-
tracts time into a formal instant.144 It is a moment within a moment, an
“Ohrenblick” within the Augenblick, an inner fracture within the totality, re-
sulting in what Lévinas calls a diachronic coexistence in which the time of the
“I” is suspended by the time of the “Other.” Or, to use Benjamin’s definition
of aura, it is a “strange weave of space and time” that requires the donation of
a certain distance and duration to host an-Other dimension.145
Thus Beethoven’s “gift of sight” is literally a gift; it gives time for an Other
to give itself to be seen. From this perspective, music’s intrinsic temporality is
redeemed as a site/sight for a phenomenology of donation. It is only in this
way that music can be said to “understand us,” enabling the I to see itself in
the eyes of an Other. But what kind of music has this “gift of sight”? I suggest
that there are at least three mimetic qualities congruent with Adorno’s philos-
ophy which music must convey in order for its temporal gaze to be human. 
First, if “the human is its gaze,” then the music’s mimetic impulse ought to
be human. Beethoven’s music must therefore disclose an-Other human being
whose very gaze questions the “Da” of my “Dasein” (there-being), to borrow
Lévinas’s play on Martin Heidegger’s ontological concept of “being-in-the
142. On Enlightenment observation, see, for example, Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The
Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993), 21–147.
143. Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L.
Kosky (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). This phrase is repeated several times on
pages 323–24 with minor changes; the quotation here is a composite one. 
144. Or as Jacques Derrida puts it, a gift can take place only in an “instant of effraction (of the
temporal circle)”; see Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 9. Derrida’s theoretical position, in giving insight into the
essence of gift, is also purely unilateral; it is unconditional, without reciprocity, and therefore can-
not circulate. This extreme asymmetry is problematic in that it severs any genuine relation.
Derrida is probably correct in criticizing Marcel Mauss’s contradictory notions of “gift exchange”
to safeguard the gift from circulating within an economy (Given Time, 24–33 passim), but his ab-
stract withdrawal of the gift from any reciprocity is not the only way to preserve its unconditional
nature. The challenge is to think of reciprocation, or at least, the relation mediated by the instant
of the gift, in ways that are alterior to the circle of modern exchange. For a critique and extension
of Derrida’s notion of gift, see Book 2 of Marion’s Being Given.
145. Walter Benjamin, “Little History of Photography,” trans. Edmund Jephcott and
Kingsley Shorter, in Selected Writings, 4 vols., ed. Marcus Bullock et al., trans. Rodney Living -
stone et al. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996–2003), 2:518. Also see idem, “The
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations, 216; and idem, “On
Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 184.
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world”;146 it re-positions our right to be (there). What should not appear is
some kind of human substitute devoid of flesh and blood such as one of
Adorno’s incorporeal forms (an apparition, Eurydice) or a twinkle of inani-
mate nature (a star) that merely replays, however negatively, the ontological
premise of Platonic or Aristotelian thought. In contrast, a music that is anthro-
pomorphically grounded will inhabit the spaces of the human body, mimick-
ing its motions and emotions. After all, the body particularizes; it constitutes
the human being, defining each person as unique in relation to another in
space and time; only then can its “this-ness” displace the “Da” of my
“Dasein.”147 Indeed, if Merleau-Ponty is correct, it is not our minds that look
through our bodies, as if our eye-contact with music were simply a meeting 
of minds; it is a somatic intertwining.148 Or, as Lévinas writes, “The visible 
caresses the eye. One sees and one hears like one touches.”149 The gaze of 
humanity, then, is a bodily relation, a vulnerable and somatic form of knowl-
edge between irreplaceable particulars.150
Second, the body must breathe. This is not only because breath distin-
guishes the body from mere matter, particularizing the dust of nature from
which the human being is formed, but also because the fragility of its motion—
the drawing-in and breathing-out of air—locates life in the here and now of
space and time, rather than attributing it to some eternal substance or timeless
form. Breathing is the persisting sound of the transient, the movement of time
within the given-ness of time. It is life, not death; fragile, of course, but not fa-
tal. The breathing body, in fact, is not far from Adorno’s description of art’s
mimetic impulse as the sublimation of a “physiologically primordial form of
spirit” and it resonates with “the etymological connotation of the word 
‘aura,’ ” which means “breath” or “breeze” in both Greek and Latin.151 Art
ought to restore the breathing body to modern knowledge, not least in music
146. This pun is one of Lévinas’s recurring phrases: see, for example, Lévinas’s “Diachrony
and Representation,” 169; and his “Philosophy and Transcendence,” in Alterity and Tran -
scendence, 23.
147. See Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, 48–49.
148. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Intertwining—the Chiasm,” in The Visible and the
Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1968), 130–55.
149. Lévinas, “Language and Proximity,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 118. 
150. Arnie Cox, in “The Mimetic Hypothesis and Embodied Musical Meaning” Musicae
Scientiae 5 (2001): 195–212, explains that we experience music through “mimetic participation”
(196). When we perceive a performance by someone else, music fires the same motor neurons in
us as in the performer; it is as if we were performing that action ourselves. Thus hearing is not sim-
ply a mental process but a somatic one often accompanied by a covert movement of vocal muscles
(“subvocalization”). Such physical gestures suggest that musical understanding always occurs in
relation with some-body. Adorno makes a similar claim: “To imagine music is always to sing it 
inwardly: imagining it is inseparable from the physical sensation of the vocal cords” (Beethoven,
173).
151. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 113; and Hansen, “Benjamin’s Aura,” 351.
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whose very phrasing is breathing itself. But this knowledge, for Adorno, is not
predicated on just any type of breathing body, but one that is inextricably
linked to the “physical suffering” of human existence, a suffering that de-
mands nothing less than a “resurrection of the flesh” to reanimate the material
and nonidentical qualities that modern thought suppresses.152 Music’s breath
must therefore embrace suffering, an expression of pain through which “art
defends itself against . . . its law of form” states Adorno; the “formal law of
freedom” has its monadic powers undone by “the suffering countenance of
artworks.” But, as Adorno cautions, “they turn this countenance only on
those who return its gaze.”153 Thus the coldness of modern reason must be
countered by a gaze that discloses the physiological suffering of a human be-
ing whose hope of resurrection affirms its desire to be—indeed, its desire to
breathe. 
Finally, the music must imitate love (agape), the condition for an uncondi-
tional gift. While the body and its breath particularizes, it is love that brings
particulars into relation. Indeed, the problem with love, as far as the stoical
coldness of rationalist ethics is concerned, is precisely its relational particular-
ity; “compassion is always inadequate,” comment Adorno and Horkheimer,
because it only attends to some and not all;154 instead of transforming the 
basis of social injustice, its fortuitous activity merely “confirms the rule of 
inhumanity by the exception it practices.”155 Hence for Adorno, love, which 
is “one of the greatest impulses of Christianity,” has exhausted its historical
potential; a post-Christian society is one in which love has failed “to eradicate
the coldness that permeates everything . . . because it did not reach into the
societal order that produces and reproduces that coldness.”156 Of course, 
the particular failure of love is inscribed in its very nature as a relational act;
the reciprocal gaze is always specific and not some panoptic vision installed
above society.157 Thus by modern standards, love is radically unfair, subverting
the equality of reason by creating an intricate and contingent network of
152. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge,
1973), 202 and 401.
153. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 110–11. Suffering is the only authentic expression of artworks
for Adorno “just as the expression of living creatures is that of pain” (ibid., 110); hence
Beethoven’s expression always “waits with sad eyes for us to answer” (Beethoven, xi). For this
countenance to see us, the expression of suffering is not simply a copy of the pain of an individual
subject as if this were merely a reification of suffering: as the expression of an-Other, suffering has
to be the objective “expression of the work itself” (Aesthetic Theory, 111).
154. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 103.
155. Ibid., 102.
156. Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz,” 202.
157. Love’s political failure has a long history, as David Nirenberg notes in “The Politics of
Love and Its Enemies,” Critical Inquiry 33 (2007): 573–605; in fact, for Nirenberg, the politics
of love, like the politics of freedom, merely reproduces the exclusion it wants to overcome.
However, a loving politics may be asking too much of politics, given that sovereignty, if Agamben
is correct, is founded on exclusion. And, of course, love is itself scandalously exclusive in its preoc-
cupation with unique relationships. Although such exclusion is radically different from that of a
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asymmetrical and surprising relationships, each of which is unique. So despite—
or even because of—its fortuitous nature, compassion is also the antithesis of
coldness for Adorno. As the philosopher writes, people “are thoroughly cold
[because] deep within themselves they must deny the possibility of love, must
withdraw their love from other people initially, before it can even unfold.”158
As the antithesis of coldness, compassion is the only cure in a society in which
knowledge is divorced from love: hence “to rescue is to love things” states
Adorno. And to “love things,” explains Bernstein, is to know things with the
kind of “contingency, sensuousness, and vulnerability” that modern knowl-
edge distrusts as blind, sentimental, and irrational.159 There has to be an “af-
fective investment” in the object, what Adorno calls “the moment called
‘cathexis’ in psychology,” in which knowledge becomes inextricably personal,
discovering the “who” and not simply the “what” of the particular. “[T]he
joining of cathexis and mimetic reaction form[s] the full pull and tug of 
the object,” explains Bernstein, “its cognitive mattering,” its freedom.160 At
the most basic level, this form of knowledge is somatic; it means “taking your
pain . . . as equivalent to my own”; in attending to the sensuous particular,
“compassion immediately figures the integrity of the body.”161 Love is there-
fore inextricably somatic, yet, because it is relational and not material, love per-
sists beyond the body. It is a commitment that never fails to be given;162 “this
devotion,” this “relation to the other as other,” says Lévinas, “is time” because
it gives time without limit.163 Love is eternal, then, only in the sense that it is
infinitely patient and infinitely giving.164 This is why Zizioulas champions
agape as the replacement for substance (or nature) in the ontology of the 
discriminatory politics, it is easy to slip from one to the other when power is at stake. Nirenberg’s
history of love’s political failure is as much a history of its use and abuse. What I want to develop
here is not a politics of love but a particular mode of love (agape) that relates to alterity in giving
time for the other. 
158. Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz,” 200–201.
159. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, 406.
160. Ibid., 401. 
161. Ibid., 406 and 408.
162. As Saint Paul famously writes, love “remains” and “never fails” (I Cor. 13:8 and 13
[NIV]).
163. Lévinas, “Diachrony and Representation,” 173.
164. In fact, for Adorno, “the joining of cathexis and mimetic reaction” forms the basis for an
authentic experience of art; “immersed in [the] immanent movement” of music’s sensuous ratio-
nality, the subject is “recomposed by the ear in accordance with [the artwork’s] own logic.” Such
listening “demands work and effort . . . strength of attention and memory, . . . [it] demands, in
fact, love.” Adorno is articulating a way of hearing the detail within the whole that “discloses the
richness of the detail on which it dwells rather than hurrying past it to the whole with an anxious
impatience.” True listening, like love, is a giving of time in terms of an infinite patience for the ob-
ject’s self-disclosure. The citations are from Adorno, “Presuppositions,” in Notes to Literature
2:97; idem, “Schwierigkeiten,” 289; and idem, “Schöne Stellen,” in Musikalische Schriften V, 
vol. 18 of Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), 699.
Also see Nicholsen, Exact Imagination, esp. 15–58; the translations are from 5 and 18–19.
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person.165 The metaphysics of the transient particular finds its temporal per-
manence in an unbreakable bond; “outside the communion of love,” writes
Zizioulas, “the person loses its uniqueness and becomes a being like other be-
ings, a ‘thing’ without absolute ‘identity’ and ‘name,’ without a face.”166
Love is “the condition of the very possibility of uniqueness.”167
Thus “the delicate aura of the other” does not give access to some eternal
essence of humanity—to its soul, nature, mind, or spirit—but opens a tempo-
ral window into the transient, breathing body of a human being who secures
her unique existence in being loved. These indicators of alterity—body,
breath, love—are not arbitrary signs: they parallel the three elements that
Naomi Cumming identifies as the way in which subjectivity presents itself in
music—gesture (shape), voice (timbre), and will (tonal motion).168 However,
as the Other of the subject these indicators are anterior to the ego’s self-
presentation: The Other is not gesture, but merely a body; it is not voice, but
its breath; it is not will but love, a relation prior to the volitional act.169
Alterity in music is therefore a suspension of the subject, a dis-articulation of
its gestural, vocal, and volitional display. Of course, it is not that there is no
longer shape, timbre, or motion, since without these qualities the music will
cease to be music. But in the same way that seeing the invisible is, in Lévinas’s
words, a vision of a “being-without-insistence . . . [a] being-on-tiptoe . . .
without name . . . stripped bare of all attributes,” so hearing the inaudible is
the sound of a being prior to the subject’s self-presence.170 But the question
remains: where in Beethoven’s music can such a gaze be returned?
The Body and Memory
Hans-Günter Ottenberg suggests that some of Beethoven’s music recalls 
the Empfindsamkeit of C. P. E. Bach.171 The term “Empfindung” in the eigh-
teenth century carried connotations of both sensory perception and emotional
sensibility, and Empfindsamkeit was the manner in which the sentient and sen-
165. See Zizioulas, “On Being a Person,” 45–46.
166. Ibid., 42; and idem, Being as Communion, 49. The relationship between nature (body)
and love is summarized by Zizioulas in terms of biological and ecclesial existence; see Being as
Communion, 49–65.
167. Lévinas, “Diachrony and Representation,” 168.
168. See Naomi Cumming, “The Subjectivities of ‘Erbarme Dich,’ ” Music Analysis, 16
(1997): 5–44. For a full account on Cumming’s philosophical position see her The Sonic Self:
Musical Subjectivity and Signification (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
2000).
169. On love as a restraining of the will, see Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 106–7.
170. Emmanuel Lévinas, “From the One to the Other: Transcendence and Time,” in Entre
nous, 143). 
171. Hans-Günter Ottenberg, Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, trans. P. J. Whitmore (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1987), 192–98.
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timental body articulated its musical feelings. In an attempt to simulate this
psychosomatic flux, C. P. E. Bach disrupts the regular rhythms of the High
Baroque with a music that moves in fits and starts. The formal surface breaks
down under the emotive pressure, and the body obtrudes through the gaps.
Indeed, his scores for clavichord are somatic scripts; they are meticulously no-
tated with tactile signs—Bebung, Tragen, staccato, slurs—that define the par-
ticular “touch” required to arouse the humors and tingle the nerve fibers,
creating a musical sensorium in which the audience can vibrate sympathetically
together.172
The expressive indications alone in Beethoven’s late works are enough to
suggest a return to this pre-heroic aesthetic—“mit inniger Empfindung” or
“Appassionato e con molto sentimento” or simply “molto espressivo.”173 Such
music divests itself of the stoical body of the revolution, with its cold, imper-
meable surfaces. This unflinching body gives way to the sentient as feeling 
disrupts form. And as with C. P. E. Bach, it is through notation that the body
in late Beethoven presses its emotions against the surface; it protrudes as
densely populated markings of touch and expression that suddenly crowd the
score with emotional ruptures. At such points the body becomes thematic; 
the human discloses itself.
The very last chord of the Cavatina in the B-flat-major String Quartet, 
Op. 130, is an example of such a disclosure (see Ex. 4). It is just a tonic chord,
of course, nothing more than what would be expected from a concluding
sonority. As a tacit function of closure, it hardly draws attention to itself, and
yet visually what should be a simple notational act—a block of half notes—
takes on an expressive density that clutters the final measure with minute per-
formance indications. These are physiological markings. There are no less then
four dynamic signs crammed within one measure (m. 66)—piano, crescendo,
diminuendo, pianissimo. And in place of a final half note, there are four eighth
notes tied together in order to quantify the exact amount of expressive shad-
ing required on each division of the beat.174 This is a written-out breath—but
not just any breath; Beethoven demands of his notation a specific psychoso-
matic motion of intense emotive force, one that disrupts the respiratory
rhythms of the lungs. The breath is asymmetrical; first a sharp intake of air
(crescendo), then a sudden suspension (piano), followed by another gasp
172. See Chua, Absolute Music, 114–25.
173. See the Piano Sonatas, Op. 106 (third movement), Op. 109 (finale), and Op. 110 (first
movement), and the final section of the Heiliger Dankgesang in the A-minor Quartet, Op. 132;
italics added.
174. Emil Platen discusses the notation of this chord and other examples of what he calls
“differenzierte Lautstärken-Rhythmisierung” in the late quartets in “Zeitgenössische Hinweise
zur Aufführungspraxis der letzten Streichquartette Beethovens,” in Beiträge ’76–78: Beethoven-
Kolloquium 1977: Dokumentation und Aufführungspraxis, ed. Rudolf Klein (Kassel, Bärenreiter,
1978), 105. Also see David B. Levy, “ ‘Ma però beschleunigend’: Notation and Meaning in 
Ops. 133/134,” Beethoven Forum 14 (2007): 129–49.
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(crescendo) before allowing the rib-cage to sink back (diminuendo) to a point
of rest (pianissimo, pause). On the face of it, this is a common chord, but the
emotional intensity that shapes the sonority remolds the facial surface, creating
a physiognomy that pierces the cadence with a gaze from deep within.
The depth of these eyes literally derive from the interior of the music, for
the final “breath” of the “Cavatina” is itself a consequence of severe respira-
tory symptoms in the middle of the movement where a sudden change of
mood and mode takes the music into another world (Ex. 5).
Formally, it is an insertion, a foreign body that distances itself from its lyrical
surroundings. Perhaps this is because it is a quotation that telescopes the psy-
chological breakdown of the Arioso dolente in the A-flat-major Piano Sonata,
Op. 110, written some four years earlier. Not only does Beethoven recall the
breathless gestures of the Arioso (mm. 116–131), but he selects the unmistak-
able harmonic twist of the opening recitative and lays it down as the harmonic
pulsations for the central section of the Cavatina (Ex. 6).175 What surfaces,
then, at the center of the Cavatina is the fragmentary recollection of a previous
work that vanishes as suddenly as it appears. It might be construed as one of
Adorno’s fleeting apparitions, an ephemeral glimmer that fades in the spaces
vacated by the subject. Indeed, Wolfgang Osthoff suggest that this central sec-
tion may refer to “ombra” scenes that haunt certain subgenres of cavatina.176
175. See also Daniel K. L. Chua, The “Galitzin” Quartets of Beethoven: Opp. 127, 132, 130
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 193–98. As we shall see, these breathless ges-
tures occur in other late works, but the Arioso and Cavatina provide the most extended and
heightened examples, and are therefore the most closely related in detail.
176. Wolfgang Osthoff, “Mozarts Cavatinen und ihre Tradition,” in Helmut Osthoff zu
seinem siebzigsten Geburtstag, ed. Ursula Aarburg and Peter Cahn, 139–77 (Tutzing: Hans
Schneider, 1969). Lewis Lockwood in Beethoven: Studies in the Creative Process (Cambridge, MA:








































































Example 4 Beethoven, String Quartet in B-flat Major, Op. 130, Cavatina, mm. 65–66
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Example 5 Beethoven, String Quartet in B-flat Major, Op. 130, Cavatina, mm. 40–48
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But this quotation, because of its sheer physicality, is less a ghost than a mem-
ory in the Proustian sense. In À la recherche du temps perdu, to remember is
not some phantom operation of the mind. Rather time lost is retrieved in the
“the composite memory of [the body’s] ribs, its knees, its shoulder blades”; it
is in “the position of various limbs” that the forgotten spaces and objects 
of “far-distant days” are re-coordinated for Proust.177 So despite its fleeting 
appearance, the quotation in the Cavatina is strangely embodied. It is as if the
respiratory figures are located in the throat, ribs, and guts of the music’s an-
thropomorphic movements, rendering the past painfully present. The “body,”
as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “takes possession of time.”178 This means that in the
temporal disruption of the Cavatina, there is a mimetic encounter with a per-
son and not some spectral recollection or generalized emotive state commonly
177. Marcel Proust, Swann’s Way, part 1 of In Search of Lost Time, trans. C. K. Scott
Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, rev. D. J. Enright (London: Vintage, 1996), 4. Henri Berg -
son’s exploration of time has often been compared to Proust’s. Memory, for Bergson, is also a
bodily habit; in Matter and Memory (1896), trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer
(New York: Zone Books, 2004), 153, he writes: “It is from the present that the appeal to which
memory responds comes, and it is from the sensori-motor elements of present action that a mem-
ory borrows the warmth which gives it life.” This is actually borne out by Beethoven’s own mem-
ory of the Cavatina. According to Karl Holz, “even the remembered feelings aroused by this piece
always cost him new tears” (italics added); see Wilhelm von Lenz, Beethoven: Eine Kunststudie, 
6 parts in 5 vols. (Cassel: Balde; and Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1855–60), vol. 5, pt. 4, 
p. 217; and Thayer, Thayer’s Life of Beethoven, 975.
178. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London:














































































Example 6 The harmonic quotation of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata, Op. 110, third movement,
in the Cavatina, mm. 42–46
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ascribed to music’s abstract affections and topical references: “time [remem-
bered] is someone” or rather somebody—a unique, sensuous particular.179 To
register this body is to give it time.
Moreover, this memory is Proustian in that the material it recollects is not a
deliberate imitation of Opus 110 as if it were a conscious attempt to master
the past; rather it is an opaque resemblance that re-assembles the fragmentary
data as a seemingly involuntary act of the memory. What surfaces in the
Cavatina are merely transient elements of Opus 110, but they are now so in-
tense that they seem preserved in the present. A motivic shape, a harmonic
progression, a gesture, an accompanimental figure180—these tiny details are
reconfigured from the original sonata. But the harmonic twist into the remote
realm of C-flat major (the flattened submediant), endows the material with an
auratic “appearance [Erscheinung] of a distance”181—the glow of a lost mo-
ment of happiness—turning these opaque resemblances almost translucent; in
effect, a dream-like aura radiates through the somatic suffering the Cavatina
enacts, rendering the disfigured body strangely beautiful. This somebody, in
other words, is not only physically there as an unsightly disturbance disrupting
our time: its beauty glows at us. Or as Benjamin would put it: the music sud-
denly “lifts up its eyes.” “To perceive the aura of an object we look at,” he
writes, “means to invest it with the ability to look at us in return. This experi-
ence corresponds to the data of [Proust’s] mémoire involontaire.”182 What
confronts us, then, in the Cavatina is a body and its aura: a suffering that looks
at us.
“Beklemmt” [constricted, uneasy, anguished] is Beethoven’s marking for
these six measures of breathless stuttering. Exactly what is said is hardly rele-
vant since the first violin appears barely able to speak; it is choking on its own
words. The lyricism that opens the movement is reduced to a kind of wheez-
ing, as if the diaphragm, which regulates the long phrases in the outer sections
of the Cavatina, has collapsed into spasmodic twitching. The delayed phrases
and reiterated gestures indicate that there is a kind of stickiness at the back of
the throat that prevents the notes from articulating themselves on time; they
are syncopated, disrupted by the tiny gasps of air that become increasingly
breathless (from eighth-note to sixteenth-note rests), so that what is said
comes out as half-torn sentences or just as isolated, stuttering syllables. These
para-linguistic markings are the superfluous articulations inscribed in what
Lévinas would call the “sensorial content” of suffering, an excess signification
whose “uselessness” underlines the intrinsic “nothingness” of such affliction:
179. Mauro Carbone, The Thinking of the Sensible: Merleau-Ponty’s A-Philosophy (Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 2004), 4.
180. The central section of the Cavatina is assembled from the following measures of the
third movement of Opus 110: mm. 1–3 (harmony), mm. 7–8 and 115 (accompaniment), and
mm. 116–131 (motifs and gesture).
181. Benjamin “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 184; translation modified.
182. Ibid., 196n17 and 184.
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the pain is “for nothing.” This “refusal of meaning” thrusts itself forward in
the Cavatina as the physiology of a dysfunctional body that can no longer 
coordinate itself,183 as if its suffering were unutterable, leaving the muteness of
the body to “speak.”
What is “said,” then, appears immediate in its palpability, evoking a sensu-
ous impact that demands of us an affective investment in its pain. And yet this
sensory appeal is simultaneously distanced by the formal disruption of the 
beklemmt section; the remote thematic and harmonic material is a shock, pre-
venting the pain of the Other from being mastered by the sympathetic vibra-
tions of Empfindsamkeit or the logic of some formal law. This is because the
material has no cause; there is no motivic source or tonal sense to this seem-
ingly accidental appearance. So instead of in-forming the structure, the mate -
rial de-forms it, evoking the incomprehension that Lévinas demands if 
the Other is to be preserved rather than possessed. Indeed, pain for Lévinas is
the very way in which alterity disrupts form; it opposes the “synthesis of the
Kantian ‘I think,’ ” he states, preventing the subject’s grasp of the whole.184
Thus suddenly, in the disjunction of the Cavatina, we are confronted by the
suffering of an unknown gaze that “wants to be gazed upon,” precisely be-
cause it resists the grasp of the modern eye. This, however, is not the gaze of
one “standing firm,” as in the Ninth Symphony, but of one who is broken, ex-
pressing a vulnerability which is as foreign to the modern subject as the bek-
lemmt section is to the rest of the Cavatina. Indeed, if the steely vision of the
Ninth merely confirms the form by resisting the necessity of the recapitula-
tion, the eyes of the Cavatina by their very weakness disarm the structure ren-
dering its content contingent.
Breathing, sentient, broken: the eyes of the Cavatina bear the marks of 
alterity. But in order for this gaze to be human, this seeing and giving cannot
be a unilateral act but a relational one: it takes two to be human. So if Beetho -
ven’s “music has the gift of sight,” as Adorno claims, if “the human is its
gaze,” then the Cavatina has to be explored from two perspectives: from the
Self ’s relation to the Other, and from the Other’s relation to the Self.
The Form of the Other 
The Self ’s relation to the Other is necessarily a mixture of hostility and hospi-
tality. To host a stranger, as Derrida points out, is always an aporetic act,
caught in the tension between mastery and altruism: it is selfless in that it re-
ceives the Other without question, but domineering in that it requires borders
to demarcate the play of power between the self and the Other.185 In aesthetic
183. See Lévinas, “Useless Suffering,” in Entre nous, 91–93.
184. Ibid., 91.
185. See Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to
Respond, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).
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terms, such mastery of content is form; any altruism toward the Other will
necessarily create a structural tension. So if the somatic gaze at the center of
the Cavatina questions the “Da” of our “Dasein,” then the formal relationship
between the outer and inner sections of the movement ought to model the
position (Da) of our being (Sein) in the face of alterity. On a cursory level,
nothing could be simpler than the A1BA2 arrangement of the Cavatina; the
formal contract between the outer A sections holds the structure in symmetry,
like the pillars of an arch (Fig. 1). Indeed, nothing could be more generic than
this ternary pattern. It functions, as with most forms, as a basic concept
(Begriff ), designed to grasp (greifen) the increasingly mixed messages of the
musical material since the late eighteenth century by cutting across generic
and taxonomic distinctions and by subsuming musical particulars under some
higher order.186 In this sense, form is the aesthetic equivalent of Lévinas’s
“synchrony of representation” that seizes the material as something to be
gazed at in an instant. The ternary structure grasps the music as a spatial 
present; it takes “control of the now [main-tenant]” by appropriating what is
“at hand [main],”187 fashioning the form as “the beautiful in music.”188 But
the formal law, as we have noted, is always hidden by the purity of its rational
abstraction; its “beauty,” as Adorno writes, “is sullied by the manipulative,
‘composed’ violence of its exemplary works.” It is for this reason that Adorno
speaks of formal coercion as the terror “peer[ing] out of the eyes of beauty.”189
In the Cavatina, however, the disruption of form opens the eye of an Other
as a counterfigure to that terror. The gaze strips the music of its formal beauty,
disabling the symmetrical function of the outer sections by grasping the form
as the music circles from A1 back to A2. In Lévinas’s terms, there is an inner
fracture within the synchrony of form that results in a “deformalization of
time.”190 The music is out of time, or more precisely, in an-other time, creating
a moment of temporal differentiation—a “diachrony.”191 This is because the
186. “Begriff” is derived from the verb “greifen” (to grasp), as is the word “griff ” (grasped)
and “Griff” (the grasp). On form and concept see Spitzer, Music as Philosophy, 231. Although
non-identity in Adorno’s thought is often taken to be that which eludes the concept (a non-
conceptual remainder), it is important to distinguish in Adorno’s thought between the “simple
concept” and the “thick concept,” as J. M. Bernstein reminds us. Whereas the former suppresses
the nonidentical with its logical abstractions, the latter involves a material dimension (the material-
ity of the Other) which Adorno wants to inscribe in thought. The material, of course, is precisely
what we have been trying to “conceive” in this analysis. See Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment
and Ethics, 263–329.
187. Lévinas, “Nonintentional Consciousness,” in Entre nous, 130; and idem, “The
Philosophical Determination of the Idea of Culture,” in Entre nous, 181 and 180.
188. Eduard Hanslick, The Beautiful in Music, ed. Moris Weitz, trans. Gustav Cohen (New
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957); Hanslick’s description of music as the “self-subsistent form of the
beautiful” (9) derives form Kant’s third critique.
189. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 48 and 52.
190. Lévinas, “Diachrony and Representation,” 175; italics added.
191. Lévinas’s use of the term “diachrony” differs from common usage in Saussurean linguis-
tics where it describes the historical development of an object. For Lévinas, “diachrony” stands in 
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constricted center should not be there. If, as Lévinas suggests, the human be-
ing is not Dasein (“being there”) but Utopia (literally, “being nowhere”),192
then the beklemmt section is human by virtue of having no formal position.
Structurally, it should serve as a transition, a temporal function normally sub-
sumed by the formal economy as a link between the A sections. But this link is
“a transition to nowhere” since the outer segments are tonally and themati-
cally self-contained, requiring no harmonic connection. The transition cannot
be grasped because it is superfluous. Its movement from C-flat major to A-flat
minor was originally a transition to “somewhere” in the Opus 110 Sonata
from which it derives (see Ex. 6), but in the Cavatina it merely disconnects the
form as a redundant function. Thus the center finds itself dis-placed as a
stranger and sojourner, surfacing like some repressed memory in the “wrong”
piece and the “wrong” key.
With the untimely and unseemly arrival of the “nowhere” (the human)
from “elsewhere,” the position of the form is put into question. Its conceptual
opposition to the “synchrony of representation” in which the ego synthesizes what it sees in the
present; “diachrony” is the harmonization of different temporalities without reduction.
192. Johan F. Goud, “Wat men van zichzelf eist, eist men van een heilige: Een gesprek met
Emmanuel Lévinas,” Ter herkenning 11 (1983): 85–86, cited in Hent de Vries, Minimal
Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in Adorno and Lévinas, trans. Geoffrey Hale (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 371.
                “Formal symmetrical grasp” 
              A1                   B                A2 
           mm. 1–39     mm. 40–48   mm. 49–66 
                                “beklemmt” 
[           ]
Figure 1 Beethoven, String Quartet in B-flat Major, Op. 130, Cavatina, the ABA structure
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present (its main-tenance) is disturbed by an ungraspable past. Instead of plac-
ing the “no place” within its symmetrical structure, the form of the Cavatina
re-conceives its center as an opening in which the asthmatic material is given
space to breathe. Sensing the trace of another work, the outer sections simply
draw back without impinging on the material. There is no motivic, thematic,
or harmonic attempt at integration at the points of contact. They give way
to create a clearing in which an Other can give itself. The paradox of “giving
way”—the donation of distance—is the reception of the Other. Adorno calls
this “distanced nearness.”193 It is a “relation without relation” in which time is
given (distance) in order to host (nearness) the delayed presence of alterity.194
Structurally, this (non)-relation is reflected in the harmonic homonyms be-
tween the outer and inner sections of the Cavatina, where the same sounds
bearing different meanings simultaneously close and open the gaps that parti-
tion the centre of the form. The E  tonic that concludes the A1 section lingers
into the “constricted” center as a pulsation of triplets that pave the way for the
emergence of the beklemmt melody; but with the latter’s appearance, the E 
suddenly finds itself disjointed as the mediant of C-flat major (Ex. 5, mm. 39
and 42, violin 2). Similarly, the F –E  sigh that closes the beklemmt section is
estranged in the very next measure with its repetition at the beginning of the
A2 section; what was a motion toward the dominant of A-flat minor (m. 47:
cello) is suddenly transformed into a Neapolitan cadence in E-flat major 
(m. 48). In both cases, the harmonic syntax is short-circuited, as if to preserve
the strangeness of the Other, and yet this sense of juxtaposition is mediated by
identical sounds. Thus the violence of the formal disruption is structurally
noncoercive, for the sense of estrangement is one of reception just as its dis-
tance is one of nearness. “Only by the recognition of distance in our neigh-
bour” writes Adorno, “is strangeness alleviated: accepted into consciousness.
The presumption of undiminished nearness present from the first, however,
the flat denial of strangeness, does the other supreme wrong, virtually negates
him as a particular human being and therefore the humanity in him, ‘counts
him in,’ incorporates him in the inventory of property.”195
To state that the Cavatina is in some kind of ternary or Da Capo form so
typical of this operatic genre would be correct, but only inasmuch as its struc-
ture is mistaken as a monad. The movement, after all, is not some totality that
conceptualizes the nonidentical as the same, for the beklemmt section is an un-
necessary structural gesture that suspends the form at its center. If a form has
to be designated, then the Cavatina demonstrates a form of hospitality, which
193. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 90. This phrase sums up a passage on the gaze of human 
relationships: “But in the long, contemplative look that fully discloses people and things, the urge
towards the object is always deflected, reflected. Contemplation without violence, the source of all
the joy of truth, presupposes that he who contemplates does not absorb the object into himself: a
distanced nearness” (89–90).
194. Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 80.
195. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 182.
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is a non-form in so far as it fails to absorb the “transition-to-nowhere” some-
where within its ranks. As Lévinas writes: “the welcoming of the other by 
the same” disturbs the totality of the Same with the infinity of an Other.196
The beklemmt section leaves its trace in a form where the absolute character of
alterity—its infinite irreducibility—finds a temporary place to be. 
A shelter for alterity is contrary to Adornian thought: it denies critical the-
ory of the alienation it champions. So for Adorno, the Cavatina does not host
the stranger but is itself estranged, forcing the hand of the composer to release
its conceptual grasp of the material; all that is retained of the form is the out-
line of what is no longer there. “Nowhere” is not the human, for Adorno, it is
merely a place-holder to be left vacant for the future. “The dying hand” writes
Adorno concerning the Cavatina, “. . . releases what it has previously clutched
fast, shaped, controlled, so that what is released becomes its higher truth.”197
There is no hospitality here: Beethoven’s fist opens to receive nothing; it yields
to distance without nearness; the “dying hand” surrenders its possession as a
final act, a farewell to form. Form in late Beethoven is therefore a trace of the
concept for Adorno, an apparition whose absent presence is figured as a con-
vex hole punctured by escaping subjectivity. What Adorno calls “hollowness
turned outwards” are the vanishing outlines of this convex shape that formal
types tend to delineate in their grasp of the material.198 In this sense, the bek-
lemmt section could be perceived as the after-image of these forms—the curve
of an arch-form, the apex of a ternary structure, the bend of a transitory
“bridge” passage, or even a Schenkerian Urlinie as it turns back from an upper
neighbor-note motion.199 But the form of the Cavatina is, in fact, the inverse
of Adorno’s convex holes. Indeed, its shape returns to the etymological origin
of the word “concept,” not as the German “Begriff,” but as the Latin “con-
ceptus”: an entity that is concave. Form is a basin, a shape that receives, evok-
ing “the gesture of ‘welcoming’ rather than that of ‘grasping.’ ”200 The outer
sections of the Cavatina therefore delineate the rim of a hollow, not in the way
that Adorno might construe it—as a hole pushed out by the escape of the
subject—but in the way Merleau-Ponty perceives it—as the very shape of 
the subject itself (Fig. 2). The hollow (creux) for Merleau-Ponty “expresses
the encounter of subjectivity with the world,”201 an encounter in which the
196. Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, 43.
197. Adorno, Beethoven, 193. To illustrate this idea Adorno cites the Cavatina, but not 
the last measure or the beklemmt section; he refers to measures 23–30 where a cadential cliché is
repeated.
198. Ibid., 126.
199. The Schenkerian Urlinie evolved from a symmetrical convex structure, evident in earlier
graphs, with an initial ascent mirroring the final descent. In the case of the Cavatina, a convex
Schenkerian shape is outlined by a large neighbor-note motion from G, prolonged in the initial
section, rising to A  in the middle section before returning to G in the final section.
200. Carbone, Thinking of the Sensible, 47.
201. See ibid., xvi.
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subject is simultaneously active and passive, no longer the author of its
thoughts but a chamber in which the Other resonates, like a “melody [that]
sings itself within us much more than we sing it”; “the body,” he writes, “is
suspended in what it sings” in the same way that the resonance of the bek-
lemmt melody suspends the formal symmetry of the movement.202 The
Cavatina registers the metaphysics of the particular as a form of reciprocation
that gives (way) by receiving what is given. This gift is Beethoven’s “gift of
sight.” The eyes that pierce through the formal fractures speak of the recep-
tion of the Other and not its alienation. In the concave structure of the
Cavatina, what is rendered invisible by the instrumentality of modern vision is
made visible by a receptive distance that draws back for the infinity of the
Other to “show itself . . . [by] giving itself.” The hollow, in the words of Jean-
Luc Marion, allows for the “individuation of the Other”; it reaches the Other
“in his unsubstitutable particularity, where he shows himself like no other
Other can. This individuation,” states Marion, “has a name: love.”203
If, in the hollow of the Cavatina, the form hosts an encounter with es-
trangement, then its expression of love is primarily “structural” and not emo-
tional, despite the excess of Empfindung. So what is the structure of love—its
“formal law,” as it were? Love, writes Judith Butler, is “our willingness to be-
come undone in relation to others”; it “constitutes our chance of becoming
human.”204 The decision to “give way” in the Cavatina is structural only as an
202. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France, ed. Domi -
nique Séglard, trans. Robert Vallier (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 174;
quoted in Carbone, Thinking of the Sensible, xv; translation modified by Carbone. The inspiration
behind Merleau-Ponty’s ideas here is Proust.
203. Marion, Being Given, 323–24.
204. Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 136. Although love is not specifically mentioned in
the closing paragraph of the book from which the quote is taken, it is implied in the context of the
overall argument; in particular, it summarizes the discussion on love and fallibility in Adorno’s
thought (101–11).
“grasping” the material “ ”
Figure 2 Three formal shapes
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undoing of structure, an injury that indents a space for the transient particular
to resonate within a permanent relationship. Its fleeting appearance, no more
than 10 measures in a 66-measure movement, is preserved with all its sensory
immediacy precisely because it is hosted and not subsumed. A concave form,
then, is always in some sense wronged by the Other and, counter to theories
of musical form, it does not exercise the right to correct itself.205 Hence the
failure to integrate the constricted center of the Cavatina results in a lopsided
rendering of its projected symmetry: the final A section is severely telescoped
on account of the brevity of the beklemmt section in order not to overwhelm
the delicate aura of difference.206 The formal disunity at the center of the form
is not merely the crucible for critique that Adorno advocates in late
Beethoven; it is the structure of love. To reconceive the structure in this way—
from the convex to the concave—is to convert form as an exclusionary prac-
tice that expels foreign bodies in order to maintain its internal integrity, to one
where form loses its grip on the purity of its content, preserving a difference-
in-relation. Miroslav Volf, employing another concave metaphor, calls this
kind of gesture “the will to embrace”; it describes a process of self-donation
“prior to any judgement about others, except that of identifying them in their
humanity.”207 This embrace, for Volf, does not simply welcome the other, but
always ends with a release that is the beginning of another embrace in an 
unending process of recognition and differentiation.208 Volf ’s open gesture of
205. In a recent article, “Normalizing the Abnormal: Disability in Music and Music Theory,”
this Journal 59 (2006): 113–84, Joseph N. Straus offers a music-theoretical ethics of the dysfunc-
tional body. Straus argues for the embodiment of disability within music from the turn of the
nineteenth century in which abnormal or deformed elements are normalized through processes of
tonal resolution; this strategy is reflected in the music analytical discourses of form theorists such
as A. B. Marx, and the organic of theories of Schoenberg and Schenker. Straus understands the
process of normalization as one of healing and overcoming, although there is a tension between
the ethics of his own analyses and the ideas of the theorists he cites for whom the abnormal is stig-
matized as paralyzing or deformed. From the latter perspective, normalizing the normal could be
construed as less humane; indeed, one could take a more Foucauldian position on nineteenth-
century medical practice and see the normal as a way of disciplining and defining the abnormal.
After all, the musical process defined by the theorists is akin to a judgment in which the disabled
are reformulated under a concept (the normal). In Lévinasian terms, the Other is subsumed un-
der the Same; or in Adorno’s terms, the nonidentical is suppressed by the identical. The issue boils
down to whether the musical anomaly is seen medically or humanly: is it an illness (a bad thing) to
be healed or a person (not a thing) whose infinite value remains the same whatever her condition?
The beklemmt section is obviously an expression of vocal disability. However, this voice represents
a person; it is therefore not an illness to be overcome but is someone to be received; it is not
healed, but loved. Music’s normalizing process (judgment) is suspended in order to allow the
“who” and not the “what” to be seen.
206. The first A section is 39 measures long, whereas the final A section, filling only 18 mea-
sures, is roughly half the original length. 
207. Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness,
and Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 29.
208. Ibid., 145.
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.78 on Wed, 3 Sep 2014 22:58:54 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Beethoven’s Other Humanism 621
deferred closure provides an analogy for the formal processes at work in the
Cavatina. Not only is the form “concave” with the A sections delineating 
a space in which the beklemmt melody resonates; the form also ends with a 
release. Having embraced the stranger, the final A section gives way again, re-
linquishing the formal need to recapitulate its secondary material. As the move-
ment draws to a close, the “constricted” material quietly resurfaces (mm. 57–
66); it illuminates the thematic contours until it indwells the last chord by 
recalling the asthmatic center in its final breath with its articulated tied notes.
But this breath is not a generalized reference; it is an exact reenactment of the
breath that concludes the beklemmt passage (mm. 46–47).209 The only differ-
ence is notational; with the final chord, Beethoven has replaced the “hairpins”
with words (crescendo, piano, diminuendo), but the dynamic shape remains the
same (Fig. 3). The glance at the center seems to be reflected toward us from
the inside out, as if the closing gesture demands of us a response—“a call”
from the unknown to return the gaze and embrace the Other.
Incognito
The Other’s relation to the Self, then, is akin to “a call.” But as the outer sec-
tions of the Cavatina give way to embrace an Other, it is unclear who is calling.
To whom does the Self return the gaze? Since an aural optics sees nothing,
merely conceding a space for “nowhere” to be, whoever is revealed as Other
always remains in some sense “empty.” Indeed, the emotive lure of the bek-
lemmt section is predicated on emptiness itself, not only by assuming the form
of a song bereft of words, but by imitating speech in the act of speechlessness.
Its failure to speak invokes an Other who cannot be re-presented because it
cannot re-present itself and so remains opaque to the subject’s grasp.
According to Marion, the call of the Other must stay anonymous if its sum-
mons is not to be appropriated as an object of knowledge. Anonymity is the
prerequisite for the nonidentical to survive: “In conformity with the principle
of insufficient reason,” writes Marion, “the claim [of the Other] does not have
to become cognized in order to become recognized, nor does it have to be
identified in order to be exerted. Only this poverty is sufficient to wound sub-
jecti(vi)ty and exile it outside of any authenticity.”210
In this light, the poverty of the musical sign acts as the wound that exiles
the subject; its blankness articulates the sonority of a face that surprises the
subject with the shock of the unknown. Marion regards this as a temporal
condition, a delay in knowledge between the surprise and the claim. “The call
209. On the thematic transformation at the close by the beklemmt material see Chua,
“Galitzin” Quartets of Beethoven, 198.
210. Jean-Luc Marion, “The Final Appeal of the Subject,” in The Religious, ed. John D.
Caputo (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 142.
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[of the Other],” he states, “comes to an understanding only belatedly
awoken, after having already begun to finish, already in the twilight of its
dawn.”211 The other is always future, as Lévinas would insist, always yet-
to-come. Or in ethical terms, when Volf defines the “will to embrace” as an
operation “prior to any judgement about others,” the suspension of judg -
ment is designed to delay the identity of the Other. The only presupposition
for Volf is that the anonymous are received “in their humanity” as if this 
constituted the bare facts of alterity.212 The human, it seems, can only be seen
without seeing because there is nothing to see, but only the time of seeing that
demands an infinite patience. It is for this reason that love is blind. And if the
anonymous are to be received only “in their humanity,” whatever is disclosed
after the temporal delay cannot alter that humanity; the delay merely figures a
permanent “blank,” a nothingness that remains within the Other. The Other
is, therefore, an empty sign: “nothing” is the minimal condition of humanity.
Of course, this “nothing” is a far cry from the void that forms the delusion of
the subject’s auto-genesis. It is not that “nothing” constitutes the human, or
that “nothing” articulates its founding gesture; rather it affirms that even if
there is no-thing to this person—no redeemable quality, no “what” that can
be assigned to the “who”—the one before me in her privation and poverty is
still fully and uniquely human. The Cavatina’s empty sign gestures to the 
plenitude of the Other in an act of kenosis. 
At first, it may appear ironic that the Cavatina should inscribe the face of
the Other as a kenotic act; alterity is not the native tongue of a genre so closely
aligned with opera.213 From its inception in the humanism of the late six-
teenth century, opera has staged the sonorous spectacle of the modern ego.
Sovereignty, not anonymity, is its theme. In operatic theory, sung speech is 
211. Ibid., 143.
212. Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 29.
213. Joseph Kerman in The Beethoven Quartets (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967),





cresc. p cresc. dim. pp
Figure 3 Beethoven, String Quartet in B-flat Major, Op. 130, Cavatina, dynamic similarity be-
tween mm. 46–47 and mm. 65–66
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the instrument by which the subject manipulates the signs of language to re-
present what its surveys as an immediate affect on its audience. The stile rapp-
resentativo, as it was called, pictures the world as a synchronic moment in 
order to control the emotive state of another’s soul.214 And Beethoven’s
Cavatina bears traces of this ancestry: the sighing semitones, the stuttering syl-
lables, the breathless syncopations, lifted from the Baroque taxonomy of emo-
tive figures, are deployed to wring from our eyes the tears that Beethoven
supposedly shed every time he thought of the work.215 But the Cavatina’s
emotional ploy goes beyond the manipulation of operatic formulas. By re-
moving language from the very style designed to represent it, Beethoven
heightens the force of the emotive will, endowing its operatic gestures with an
ineffability that overwhelms the taxonomic representation of the signs. To
borrow Kerman’s phrase, the Cavatina seems to be “battering at the commu-
nications barrier,” straining for a language beyond language.216 In effect, the
transformation of the Baroque figures into speechless rhetoric endows the op-
eratic subject with the infinite yearnings of the romantic ego, bending the out-
ward gestures of Baroque spectatorship toward an inner audition that sounds
out the pre-linguistic source of the self.217 The Cavatina is therefore the fusion
of operatic affect and romantic song, of an outward spectacle and an inward
gaze.
But as such, it is also a contradiction, for the outward staging of the sub-
ject’s inward voice undermines the music’s authenticity. It is as if the more the
subject tries to recover its originary presence, the more it discovers the oper-
atic artifice of its song, turning the moment of unmediated emergence into a
stage-managed event. Bourgeois inwardness, as Adorno points out in his cri-
tique of Kierkegaard, resembles the interior decoration of nineteenth-century
homes in which the subject’s identity is emptied out as standardized objects in
a living room.218 Perhaps it is for similar reasons that some of the most percep-
tive commentators on the Cavatina cast doubt on its sincerity; its emotive
force merely manipulates the listener with a display of inwardness that is 
nothing more than theatrical sophistry. To guard their critical faculties, these
commentators feel compelled to defend themselves from the affect these ges-
tures are supposed to elicit, either by detecting something “crass” about the
214. See Chua, Absolute Music, 29–60; and idem, “Untimely Reflections on Operatic
Echoes,” 573–79.
215. See Lenz, Beethoven: Eine Kunststudie, vol. 5, pt. 4, p. 217; and Thayer, Thayer’s Life of
Beethoven, 975.
216. Kerman, Beethoven Quartets, 194.
217. See Wellbery, Specular Moment, 22. The originary song is not simply a romantic notion,
but takes its cue from the operatic theory of the seventeenth century. See Chua, Absolute Music,
29–40 and 98–113.
218. See Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, ed. and trans.
Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 43–44.
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music,219 or by declaring the movement a “mock cavatina” whose tears re-
quire ironic distance rather than empathy. Hence the Cavatina, as Richard
Kramer puts it, needs to be treated as a “fiction.”220
But the beklemmt section, as a moment of kenosis, already certifies itself as a
fake. The “fiction” is acknowledged in the performative collapse that allows
the rhetorical husk of language to surface as feigned expression. This may ap-
pear, at first, to be a rehearsal of Adorno’s aesthetics, in which conventions are
released as a memorial of the subject’s departure. However, in the beklemmt
section, the operatic clichés are not surrendered as untouched debris; rather
the subject seems to seize them, indeed, to strangle them, producing the ex-
pressive “constriction” of the music. But in seizing the object, the subject itself
seizes up, or more aptly, collapses into seizures. It is as if the subject, in reach-
ing the liminal point of self-expression, passes over into the object and petrifies
into convention. These formulaic figures, although saturated with subjective
intention, are devoid of subjective control, becoming the involuntary twitches
of some prefabricated speech; the linguistic breakdown exposes the data of
emotion as a “discourse” prior to the subject. What undergoes kenosis, then,
is not so much the subject as its performance, unmasking the theatricality of
self-presence.221 Indeed, the Cavatina traces the history of this interior fabrica-
tion. First, by alluding to Empfindsamkeit, it recalls the sentimental aesthetic
of the mid-eighteenth century in which private life—in the form of intimate
letters and diaries—was staged as a spectacle of public virtue; the formation of
the “public sphere,” as Jürgen Habermas describes it, bears a sense of bour-
geois inwardness projected outwards.222 Secondly, as romantic song, the
Cavatina updates this dichotomy, becoming the very vehicle through which
the subject displayed its inner being in the early nineteenth century. So in re-
vealing the operatic mechanism behind the subject’s production of meaning,
the Cavatina points to the anxiety of performance in being human. The ego’s
authenticity is an act produced with social props, fraught with stage fright,
burdened with the compulsion to repeat, to rehearse, to perfect, to perform.
Music’s increasing interiority does not provide a refuge from social pressures,
219. Kerman, Beethoven Quartets, 198. While acknowledging the emotive effect the Cavatina
has had on numerous commentators, Kerman points out the “crass melodic and harmonic con-
struction,” perhaps to distance himself from the tear-jerking strategy of the music or maybe to
suggest that that the crassness is the source of the effect itself.
220. See Richard Kramer, “Between Cavatina and Overture: Opus 130 and the Voices of
Narrative,” Beethoven Forum 1 (1992): 181. Kramer hears the theatrical fiction of the Cavatina
only in relation to the Grosse Fuge; in itself, the Cavatina is real enough; indeed he refers to it as
“the direct, pure language of the lover’s soliloquy, altogether without artifice” (187) and yet, its
repudiation by the narrative voice of the fugal finale renders its pain the expression of a “fictional
character” acting a part (184); its ultimate reality is staged.
221. See note 133. 
222. See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry
into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991),
43–51.
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but bears witness to a society of surveillance, in which the inner self is judged
by the public account it gives of its integrity: I am because I perform. The
Kantian “I think,” despite (or even because of ) its noumenal inaccessibility, 
is a display that presents the subject as present; it is a being “having to speak,
having to say I . . . having to answer for one’s right to be,” writes Lévinas.223
The very failure to perfect that performance warrants an eviction from the re-
ality show that is human society. The subject’s appearance is therefore an inter-
nal process of self-performance that excludes itself as “Other” the moment it
fails to re-present the truth of its inner being.
And it is precisely this moment that the beklemmt section captures. It stages
the no-thing that remains after the inner display has collapsed, revealing the
nakedness beneath. Shame—the emotion of exposure—is the content of the
music’s inarticulate eloquence. In fact, it enacts the very blush that the critics
feel compelled to distance themselves from in their exposure to exposure, for
this is an “anti-performance,” a moment of public humiliation. The face of 
the Other is seen in the loss of face. So the point of all the operatic trappings,
with its “crass” effects and “mock” gestures, is to designate a site of perfor-
mance where one can be utterly exposed. As Lévinas writes, the face of the
Other is “extreme exposure, no defence, vulnerability itself.”224 Opera turns
out to be the perfect platform for kenosis.
But this kenosis is not merely the result of its staging; it is literally inscribed
in the score. The Cavatina’s expression of vulnerability is one of melodic expo-
sure: Beethoven desynchronizes the “vocal” line, leaving its notes naked in 
the gaps between the underlying pulsations, as if it were unable to cover the
barrenness of its existence. In particular, he isolates the beginning or end of
each phrase as a separate note. Although part of a sentence, the isolation turns
the anacrusis or cadence into some kind of speech impediment in the phrase—
a moment of hesitation or the superfluous syllable of a stutter. These naked
notes are an articulation of inadequacy because they are the waste products of
meaning; they strip the ego of its performance, exposing its failure to account
properly for itself. So what is left after this failure? By preventing its voice from
presenting song as its mode of being and in articulating the physical impedi-
ments of speech, the Cavatina gestures to the malfunction of the body as the
only condition of narration that one could provide when the very definition of
man as “one endowed with language” is no longer adequate to the particu-
lar.225 “There is a bodily referent here,” writes Butler in reference to the 
human, “a condition of me that I can point to, but that I cannot narrate 
precisely.” This “non-narrativizable exposure,” she continues, “establishes my
223. Lévinas, “Nonintentional Consciousness,” 130; reiterated in “From the One to the
Other,” 144.
224. Lévinas, Alterity and Transcendence, 24.
225. This refers to Aristotle’s definition of man as logos, whose primary meaning is “lan-
guage”; see, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Man and Language,” in Philosophical
Hermeneutics, ed. and trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 59. 
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singularity” but it also indicates a “partial opacity to myself” which can never
be accounted for let alone narrated by the norms of address “that I do not au-
thor and that render me substitutable at the very moment that I seek to estab-
lish the history of my singularity.”226 The Cavatina, in its inarticulate
eloquence, testifies to the opaque singularity of a body unable to account for
itself and, which renders its identity unknowable—even to itself. Beethoven
has transformed the sentimental display of auto-affection in Empfindsamkeit
into an expression of deprivation. In this minimal condition, the human is
simply that which is forsaken, a refugee abandoned with neither possession
nor self-possession. In the semblance of the denuded and through the gaps of
the suffocating silences, there is a “nakedness [in the Cavatina] that cries out
its strangeness to the world.”227
Lévinas would found an ethics on such an exposure: “The suffering and
vulnerability of the sensible,” he writes, is “the other in me.”228 Unlike the re-
capitulation in the first movement of the Ninth Symphony, the defenseless
face stands for an ethics that does not “stand firm”: it “resists without resist-
ing”; there is no “self-crafting” against the imposition of social norms, no
mimesis of fear, no invention of freedom that stares fate in the face. Rather, in
contrast to the sublime monad, the face of the Other, in its physical vulnerabil-
ity, commands without force.229 It is “all weakness and all authority” claims
Lévinas;230 “Those eyes,” he writes, “which are absolutely without protection,
the most naked part of the human body, nonetheless offer an absolute resis-
tance to possession.”231 Hence, for Lévinas, the vulnerability of the face
“tempts . . . the first crime”—to kill. And yet this very alterity interrupts the
sovereignty of the self with a “glory” that Lévinas assigns to “the word of
226. Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 38–39.
227. Lévinas, “Totality and Infinity: Preface to the German Edition,” in Entre nous, 198. 
228. Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than Being, or, Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis
(Pitts burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 124–25.
229. See Lévinas, “Diachrony and Representation,” 172. Unlike Adorno, Lévinas, with his
adherence to the biblical prohibition against graven images, prevents the possibility of actually see-
ing the face in art—such an image would be idolatrous, if not blasphemous; see Emmanuel
Lévinas, “Reality and Its Shadow,” trans. Alphonso Lingis, in The Lévinas Reader, ed. Seán Hand
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 131–32; the essay is also in Lévinas, Collected Philosophical Papers. To
see the face in the Cavatina, then, would de facto reduce the human to an idol. It is not that
Lévinas’s position is untenable, but that it is too general. There are alternative views; in particular,
I have alluded to the work of Jean-Luc Marion, who argues that the image should not always be
held captive by the biblical ban, but that a distinction needs to be made between idol and icon
(what is made and what is given, seeing and being seen). And, of course, there is Adorno himself,
whose commitment to the Bilderverbot does not prevent him from seeking the truth of the 
“imageless images” of art (Aesthetic Theory, 283 and 287). On Lévinas and the Jewish prohibition
of image, see Jay, Downcast Eyes, 546–60. On Lévinas and art, see de Vries, Minimal Theologies,
409–42; and Lévinas, “Philosophical Determination of the Idea of Culture,” 182–84. 
230. Lévinas, Alterity and Transcendence, 105.
231. Emmanuel Lévinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Seán Hand (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 8.
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God.”232 What illumines the face is the divine command: “Thou shalt not
kill.”233 Adorno’s “imponderably delicate aura of the other” turns out to be
the indelible law of the transient particular; the “formal law of freedom” is 
undone by the absolute command of an ephemeral glance.
If the written law—“Thou shalt not kill”—speaks through the singularity
of a face, then Lévinas’s ethics is, in a sense, incarnational: the face is the Word
made flesh.234 The law has been particularized in a body, in a person, in a
gaze. Could this gaze, then, be the face of God in Christ, reflected in the
countenance of the Other?235 Are these the “sad eyes” in Beethoven’s music
that “speak to us and wait . . . for us to answer”?236 After all, the face of Christ
is similarly defenseless and exposed, a face subject to public humiliation and
condemned because it failed to account for itself; in its human vulnerability,
his face tempts us to murder and yet, in the penetration of its gaze, dis-places
our “Da-sein.”237 If the Other who calls us to be is Christ rather than some
Platonic or Aristotelian universal, then “the particular is . . . raised to ontologi-
cal primacy,” states Zizioulas, affirming the inviolability of the unique “I am”
of each person.238
This is not to claim that the suffering that contorts the face of the Cavatina
is a direct vision of Christ incarnate. Such a claim would nullify the very possi-
bility of the vision, for Christ is the unseen face of the Other, an image that 
so identifies with the destitute that even his followers cannot recognize him 
in the face of poverty: “Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or
thirsty and give you something to drink?”239 His call, to echo Marion, is
anonymous. He is “no one.” The God-man, as Søren Kierkegaard insists,
comes “incognito”;240 his absolute anonymity constitutes his true humanity.
232. Lévinas, Alterity and Transcendence, 24, 28, and 27. The “first crime,” of course, per-
tains to Cain’s murder of Abel in Genesis 4.
233. Lévinas often quotes this idea: see, for example, ibid., 24, and idem, “Diachrony and
Representation,” 168.
234. Lévinas wants to avoid the idea of the face as an image, especially in relation to art, for
that would already constitute some kind of mask or caricature of the face: hence his alignment of
face with word. The theological idea of being “made in the image of God,” that is, made in his
“likeness,” implied in the following discussion is therefore not a literal image that functions as a
substitute for truth, as if image were separate from being; rather the image is constitutive of being
human. In Adorno’s terms, it is the elusive “aura” that radiates from within (and is) our material
being, and yet cannot be reduced to plastic or physical features.
235. Lévinas himself gestures toward the Christological resonances of his thought in “A
Man-God?” in Entre nous, 53–60.
236. Adorno, Beethoven, xi.
237. See Luke 22:61–62 (NIV).
238. Zizioulas, “On Being a Person,” 43. Thus, for Zizioulas, the answer to the question
“Who am I?” no longer reduces the “I” to a mere derivative of nature, but affirms the uniqueness
of its being as ontologically caused by a particular person. 
239. Matthew 26:37 (NIV).
240. Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 127–33.
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The incarnation, then, is paradoxically an invisible materialization that requires
an alterior optics to render present what is absent to the modern eye. It is
without image. Thus Beethoven’s “gift of sight” in the Cavatina cannot be the
direct gaze of Christ. But inasmuch as Christ in becoming man, “became no-
thing,” embodying the vulnerability of humanity in the act of kenosis,241 any
music that partakes of this suffering bears the “nothingness” of his Imago Dei.
In fact, Beethoven suggests such an affinity, for the breathing apparatus at 
the center of the Cavatina bears a close resemblance to the “Crucifixus” at the
center of the Missa solemnis. Marked “Adagio espressivo,” the “Crucifixus”
transforms the somatic gestures of Empfindsamkeit into the suffocating body
of Christ; the wounds are marked in the score by the same respiratory symp-
toms encountered in the Cavatina—the fragmentation of the violin line as it
gasps for air, the syncopated “Bebung” accompaniment that can barely lift the
ribcage of the crucified body (Ex. 7).242
Significantly, Adorno detects a “humanistic aspect” here disturbing the
coldness of the Missa; starting with the “et homo factus est,” “the music,” he
writes, “is warmed as if by a breath.”243 This breath begins with another one
of those isolated stutters, a superfluous repetition of the least significant word
of the text, “et” [and]: “et et homo factus est” (mm. 143–144). But the re-
dundant “et,” which is something of a recurring tic throughout the Credo,244
takes on its human poignancy only in the expiration of the very breath that
Adorno hears. The first “et” of this section is a rhetorical accentuation, un-
241. See Phillipians 2:6–8 (NIV).
242. Beethoven’s religious outlook is often classified as Deistic, with Masonic undertones
(and sometimes Buddhist or Hindu overtones), although it is difficult to pinpoint his beliefs from
the available documents; see, for example, Maynard Solomon, Late Beethoven: Music, Thought,
Imagination (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 135–212. However, these exotic re-
ligious variations, although useful in propping up his Promethean image, should not exclude
Beethoven’s Christian heritage as a source of influence, nor eclipse the obvious fact that his reli-
gious music is overtly Christian. Indeed, Cooper, in Beethoven, 272–73, points out that in the last
decade of Beethoven’s life, his religions inclinations became more and not less Christian. His faith
focused particularly on the suffering of Christ. In 1820 Beethoven stated that Jesus (along with
Socrates) was a model of endurance for him; see Ludwig van Beethovens Konversationshefte, ed.
Karl-Heinz Köhler et al., 11 vols. (Leipzig: VEB Deutscher Verlag für Musik, 1968–), 1:211. He
contemplated composing an oratorio on the crucifixion itself, and among the sketches for material
used in Opus 130/133 are ideas for a Dona nobis pacem (Autograph 11/2, Staatsbibliothek zu
Berlin). Although this work did not materialize, the idea surreptitiously resurfaces in a number of
compositions. David B. Levy in “ ‘Ma però beschleunigend’ ” relates certain figures in the
Cavatina, the Credo of the Missa solemnis, and the Grosse Fuge to the Crucifixus of Bach’s B-
Minor Mass. But even without such connections, the sense that this music portrays the death of
Christ is often intuitively felt: Alfred Brendel and Wilfrid Mellers, for example, regard the arioso of
Opus 110 quoted in the Cavatina, as “Passion music”; see Brendel, Alfred Brendel on Music
(Chicago: A Cappella Books, 2001), 87; and Mellers, Beethoven and the Voice of God (London:
Faber, 1983), 287.
243. Adorno, Beethoven, 149. 
244. See mm. 179–80, 188, 212, and 235.
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furled with the full force of the orchestra behind it as if to endow the incarna-
tion with a sense of nobility (“and . . . AND was made man” ); by the end,
however, it becomes the dying stammer of a suffering body—“passus . . . et 
. . . et . . . sepultus” (“suffered and . . . and . . . was buried”). It is here, “at the
end of the Passion itself,” writes Adorno, that “an expressive emphasis is
reached, as if the thought of the frailty of human beings had brought attention
back to the Passion of Christ.”245 This disjunct articulation of a grammatical

































































































































































































Example 7 Beethoven, Missa solemnis, Credo, mm. 173–176 (string section)
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conjunction suddenly finds its meaningless utterance meaningful in the voice
of one cut off from life in the final twitches of suffering (Ex. 8).246
Adorno may contend that the sovereignty of the Missa is founded on a law
of exception in which Beethoven himself is excluded from his work, but the
passages that portray Christ as excluded are precisely the “exceptional” mo-
ments in the Mass for Adorno;247 they form, as it were, the exception against
the law of exception and so point to the possibility of another order that might
be truly human. In Christ, Beethoven has somehow been included again in 
his work, but now as the Other; indeed, for Adorno he literally leaves his face
on the Missa’s edifice, like “the custom attributed to late medieval artists, who
included their own image somewhere on the tabernacle.”248 Through this 
fellowship of suffering in which the excluded are redeemed, Beethoven’s
countenance is transfigured by the alterity of Christ-in-the-Other. It is at such
points—at the minimal moments of human life—that the Missa identifies with
the no-thing of the Cavatina, breathing in solidarity with the anguished and
constricted. Or to put it the other way round, in its mimesis of suffering, the
Cavatina assumes the nature of humanity inasmuch as the crucified Christ, to
borrow the words of the Nicene Creed, “became truly human”—“et homo
factus est.”249
Who, then, is the Other in the Cavatina? The human is both some-body
and no-thing: a disclosure and erasure; Christ incognito. On the one hand, as
David B. Levy suggests, the Cavatina, in its allusion to the Missa solemnis,
evokes “the weeping and agony of the Garden of Gethsemane”;250 the passion
of Christ is inscribed in its gaze. Yet it is only the speculative ear that can “see”
the gaze, for the Cavatina neither makes the face explicit nor offers some
Christological code to be deciphered.251 There is nothing to appropriate.
246. Conjuctions such as “et” are normally deployed to facilitate coherence. Their illogical
use, according to Adorno in his Notes to Literature, undermines the communicative use of lan-
guage to underline its material, alterior dimension, that is, a language emancipated from the coer-
cion of logical concepts. Although Adorno does not discuss this aspect of the Missa, he does
mention the musical equivalent of the illogical conjunction in Mahler: “Among the idiosyncratic
features of Mahler’s use of rhythm we find isolated notes . . . in which the flow of the music comes
to a halt or rather is suspended in mid-air”; such notes resist “non-violently the essentially dra-
matic onward thrust of the symphony.” In this light, the Missa’s paratactic expression on “et”
could be seen to offer a nonviolent means of resistance to the formal coercion that Adorno hears
in the Credo. See Adorno, “Mahler,” in Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music, 104–5; 
and idem, “On Epic Naiveté,” in Notes to Literature 1:28; also see Nicholsen, Exact Imagination,
79–84.
247. The “exceptions” that Adorno singles out from the Missa are all short passages in which
Christ is portrayed in his humanity: the “Et homo factus est” of the Credo, the Benedictus, and
parts of the Agnus Dei and Dona Nobis Pacem. See Adorno, Beethoven, 147 and 149.
248. Ibid., 147.
249. English Language Liturgical Commission Translation of the Nicene Creed. 
250. See Levy, “ ‘Ma però beschleunigend,’ ” 147.
251. Such a possibility chimes with Wilfrid Mellers’s claim in Beethoven and the Voice of God
that “Beethoven’s ‘religious’ experiences [were expressed as] . . . a search for a Song that has long 
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Example 8 Beethoven, Missa solemnis, Credo, mm. 178–181
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Rather, as Kierkegaard insists, Christ incognito is an oblique communication
that reveals more about us than Christ.252 Or, as Adorno puts it, the music
“understands us” and “speaks to us.”253 Anonymity is a condition of being
seen by the Other, a “gift of sight” without any recognition.
Facing Redemption
The face. The eyes. The gaze. These optic ciphers that encrypt the Other are
strangely musical: they form “the sonority” of the face, as Lévinas puts it; or,
in Adorno’s words, they indicate music’s “gift of sight.” This sounding optics,
as we have seen, suggests a certain invisibility, a delay or distance that safe-
guards the alterity of the Other from the instrumentalized vision of the mod-
ern subject. A work, such as the Cavatina, makes the sonorous gaze thematic
by giving time for its disclosure. But what inspires this audio-visual fusion in
the philosophy of alterity is the non-representational aspect of music itself; the
vacant sign already contains the potential for this relation. Ironically, the “oth-
erness” of the sign is predicated on the blankness (invisibility), emptiness (dis-
tance), and inaccessibility (delay) that constitutes the blindness of the monad.
Sound, as the invisible vision for alterity, is grounded in the discourse of ab-
been lost or forgotten” (444), a divine voice found at the heart of the Missa solemnis. Although
Mellers’s “Song” is neither a Christological nor a covert one and tends toward divine timelessness,
there is a degree of truth in his somewhat literal and seemingly unsupported claims. What is clear
is that the Missa solemnis provided Beethoven with a religious vocabulary that surfaces in various
late works. The exact sound for God is polarized between the lyricism which Meller identifies as
“Song” and William Kinderman’s “symbol for the deity”—a stratospheric, high-volume sonority
that represents a Kantian deity ensconced above the starry heavens. But this merely reflects 
the range of Beethoven’s religious vocabulary in the Missa. Other “divine sonorities” not only in-
clude the suffering of Christ in the Credo that finds its way into the Arioso Dolente of Opus 110,
the variations of Opus 111, the Cavatina of Opus 130, and arguably the “gapped” subject of the
Grosse Fuge, but also the blessing of Christ in the Benedictus, which recurs in slow movement of
Opus 127 (as Kinderman himself points out), and the mocking of Christ in the fugato of the
“Dona Nobis Pacem,” which is taken up in the Grosse Fuge. The latter two Christological topics
are also evident in the last two movements of the Hammerklavier; although this work precedes
the Missa, Beethoven described the sonata as a “prelude to my mass.” See Kinderman, “Beetho -
ven’s Symbol for the Deity”; Maynard Solomon, “Intimations of the Sacred” in Late Beethoven,
198–212; Stephen Rumph, Beethoven After Napoleon: Political Romanticism in the Late Works
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 35–57, 195–221; Levy, “ ‘Ma però beschleuni-
gend’ ”; Erwin Ratz, “Analysis and Hermeneutics and Their Significance for the Interpretation of
Beethoven,” trans. Mary Whittall, Music Analysis 3 (1984): 243–54; and Warren Kirkendale,
“New Roads to Old Ideas in Beethoven’s Missa Solemnis,” Musical Quarterly 56 (1970):
665–701.
252. “The God-man is the sign of contradiction,” writes Kierkegaard in Practice in
Christianity, 126, born to “disclose the thoughts of [our] hearts.”
253. Adorno, Beethoven, xi.
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.78 on Wed, 3 Sep 2014 22:58:54 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Beethoven’s Other Humanism 633
solute music; the pure sign that once intimated the infinity of the romantic
ego now resonates with the infinity of the Other.254
It appears that the Other is simply the flip side of the monad. After all, 
the early romantics were the first to champion the empty sign as “Other”—
albeit the self-as-other. Music gave access to a subject that Kant had made 
famously inaccessible to knowledge. It was a non-representational sign for a
non-representable self whose invisibility was merely a cipher for the subject’s
noumenal existence. Given this self-reflexive function, it takes only a slight dis-
cursive tweak to flip the perspective of the empty sign from the monadic sub-
ject to a vision of alterity. But such inversions do not happen in the abstract:
the non-representational sign requires cultural labour to make concrete the
theoretical possibilities it harbors. The particular matters. The discursive
meanings that fluctuate around music’s empty sign exist only through works
that activate their potential. If the Eroica Symphony, for example, projects the
empty sign as a heroic monad, the Cavatina can alter that sign to reflect in its
void the aura of an Other. By attending to the music’s details, the very sign
whose blankness had all but deified the subject becomes the condition for the
disclosure of an inaccessible Other made in the image of Christ. In Marion’s
terms, the idol becomes an icon.255
However, the Other is not simply an inversion of the subject–object rela-
tion, as if it had turned the tables on the subject, demanding a unilateral sub-
mission to its alterity. Indeed, if the Cavatina evokes the gaze of Christ, then
the face of the Other is not merely a victim who demands a response but the
very Gift that breaks the economy of the Self. It is the catalyst for the metanoia
of the monad—a radical transformation of the ego’s self-existence. In such 
instances, the face of alterity is not only the law that founds the subject with its
a priori gaze, as Lévinas claims,256 it is a work of grace—a gift. In fact, grace
precedes law, for Christ-in-the-Other implies that there is a for-giving before
any giving, a debt to love before any price of love is demanded, a divine dis-
placement before any replacement of our “Da-sein.”257 In this sense, the
254. See Lévinas, Alterity and Transcendence, 30 and 75–76. 
255. For Jean-Luc Marion an idol may communicate something about God but God is
barred from challenging that representation by the human gaze; with an icon, on the other hand,
one is subject to God’s gaze. These ideas are discussed theologically in his God Without Being,
trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 7–22; and phenomeno-
logically in idem, Being Given, 199–234.
256. Lévinasian ethics still bear traces of the sublime law: the “infinite alterity” of the face
summons the subject to an “infinite responsibility.” It is a unilateral effort that presupposes a sub-
ject that can will itself to act, turning Lévinas’s asymmetrical “I-thou” relation into a strangely
nonrelational response that can reduce the idealized other to eternal victimhood. The issue, then,
is one of agency and grace, that is, whether the self can execute the ethics demanded of the Other,
and whether the Other is merely a given or a gift to be reciprocated. For a theological critique of
Lévinas’s position see John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (London: Rout -
ledge, 2003), 138–61.
257. 1 John 4:19: “We love because he first loved us” (NIV).
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Other already gives what is demanded of the Self. It is not merely the condi-
tion for a reciprocal relation, but the very agent of reciprocation itself—the
grace that inspires the subject to receive the stranger. To borrow Marion’s 
terminology, those who “give way” to grace become “gifted,”258 receiving a
talent for love that might thaw the “coldness of the societal monad.” Beetho -
ven’s “gift of sight,” then, is the grace that enables us to see the invisible aura
of humanity; it is a seeing that gives sight. It is in this sense that the eyes that
open in the closing chord of the Cavatina “understand us,” transforming the
moment of tonal stasis into one of expressive ek-stasis. Perhaps the intensity of
this gaze is conjured up by the suspended crescendo that reaches out beyond
the final bar in a gesture of open embrace; or maybe it is in the inconclusive-
ness of the final chord where the upper voice lingers on the mediant (G), as if
melodically it were holding its breath for an answer. Either way, by recalling
the central dislocation at the moment of resolution, the Cavatina gestures to
the possibility of reconciliation, giving time for a returning glance in the
drawn-out breath of its cadence. To come back to Adorno’s phrase: “It . . .
waits with sad eyes for us to answer.” Perhaps, when writing these words,
Adorno was aware of Beethoven’s confession to Karl Holz that the Cavatina
was composed “with tears of sadness in his eyes.”259 Unfortunately, Beetho -
ven did not divulge the cause of these tears, and Adorno, of course, refuses to
give the answer they seek. But neither the cause nor the desired answer are a
secret. They are already disclosed in the eyes of the Cavatina; in recalling the
humiliation of the beklemmt section, the final chord reflects the humility nec-
essary for reciprocation, for it is only in the place of exposure that one is open
to love, open to give, open to being human.260
But it is precisely for this reason that gifts are as dangerous as they are con-
ciliatory; the relation they imply is one of mutual vulnerability, an exposure
that the powers of contracts and rights are meant to cover up in the name of
the law. On hearing the final chord of the Cavatina, one wants to give way to
its radiance and give time for its beauty to resonate. The crescendo that sud-
denly disappears and the G that holds its breath seem to require an infinite
suspension of the instant. But, as the Grosse Fuge that originally followed the
Cavatina demonstrates, gifts, because they are free, need not be received. The
G that closes the Cavatina is seized by the fugue with a violence that seems to
snuff out its final breath. Moreover, the asthmatic stutterings of the beklemmt
section are mimicked in the opening “gapped” fugue (mm. 26–158); in fact,
they are mangled, since the fugal process is one in which the gaps are eventu-
ally squeezed out, compressing the subject to the point of asphyxiation (Ex. 9a
and b). The fugue’s formal law of freedom (“tânto libre,” as Beethoven de-
258. See Marion, Being Given, 248–319. The debt of love is always a gift in that it cannot by
definition be love if it is paid back; it can only be passed on.
259. Lenz, Beethoven: Eine Kunststudie, vol. 5, pt. 4, p. 217.
260. Lévinas, Is It Righteous to Be? 208. Also see Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 100–
102.
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scribes it in the score) does not give time for the material to disclose itself but
seizes it with a breath-taking virtuosity. It differs from the compression of the
heroic Augenblick only in that the violence is no longer masked by the purity
of the form. Although the gapped fugue hardly leaves its tonic (B ), the sub-
ject and countersubject suggest divergent harmonic planes that generate a dis-
sonant momentum within the tonic texture;261 this contrapuntal friction is
matched by a rhythmic dislocation that eventually buckles the position of the
downbeat (mm. 129–152). After 128 measures of unremitting volume (forte,
fortissimo, sforzando) and excruciating dissonance, the fugue loses its tonal and
metrical orientation and slams, without warning, into a wall of G-flat major
(mm. 158–159). Such destruction cannot be bypassed as the mere product of
intellectual abstraction. As with the Cavatina, Beethoven is speaking through
the breakdown of technique, but this time the Other is not seen from the van-
tage of hospitality, but hostility. From his investigation of the sketches, Levy
suggests that Beethoven conceived this fugue as an allegory of the crucifixion.
In particular, the gapped subject, with its tied eighth note notation (suspiratio)
and jagged leaps (saltus duriusculus), refers to Baroque figures associated with
the Passion through their evocation of pain, anguish, and suffering.262 This 
allegory is hardly surprising, given the allusion to the Missa solemnis in the
Cavatina. But unlike its Baroque counterparts, the rhetorical language of 
the Grosse Fuge is stripped of its communicative dimension: the sign “saltus
duriusculus,” for example, does not merely denote its signified “pain” in order
to express or picture the emotion; rather the sign wants to be “pain” in the
261. See Spitzer, Music as Philosophy, 101.
262. See Levy, “ ‘Ma però beschleunigend.’ ” Levy’s work takes up a theme explored by
Erich Schenk in “Barock bei Beethoven,” in Beethoven und die Gegenwart: Festschrift Ludwig
Schiedermair zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Arnold Schmitz, 177–219 (Berlin and Bonn: Dümmler,
1937); Schenk suggests that Beethoven’s epigrammatic use of Baroque figures in some late works
symbolizes states of suffering, deprivation, and death. This purely musicological study resonates
with Adorno’s philosophical speculations on the late style, which is informed by Benjamin’s thesis
on the Baroque Trauerspiel (mourning-play). The debris of the Baroque, which Levy and Schenk
unearth, is a counterpart to Benjamin’s allegorical figures of death. See Walter Benjamin, The
Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: NLB, 1977).
Š −−  ¼ Ł Ł ¼ Ł Ł ¼ Ł¦ Ł ¼ Ł− Ł ¼ Ł Ł ¼ Ł¦ Ł ¼ Ł Ł Ł¦ Ł− Ł Ł Ł Ł ¼
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Example 9 Beethoven, Grosse Fuge, Op. 133, “gapped” subject: (a) with gaps (mm. 26–30);
(b) without (mm. 139–41)
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very materiality of its musical figuration; and it does so by meting out violence
on the rhetorical act itself, rendering the figures grotesquely opaque. The vis-
ceral and muscular exertions demanded in the execution of these figures reveal
the very effort of form in the act of purification: this is form seen from its
boundaries of exclusion, policing its margins by pain. Indeed, Stravinsky ad-
mired the Grosse Fuge precisely for the process of brutal abstraction that
presages the formalism of his own century; what he describes as “pure interval
music” is the fugue’s violent distillation of its musical essence.263
Strangely, the Cavatina and the Grosse Fuge share similar structural disloca-
tions. However, such disruptions in themselves cannot function as generic
markers for meaning. As with the empty sign, how the concrete particular acti-
vates the structure makes all the difference to what appears to be the same.
Indeed, the juxtaposition of the Cavatina and the Grosse Fuge magnifies the
minute slippage between the structures of love and violence that humanity all
too easily confuses.264 And perhaps it is the truth of this confusion that was
too close for comfort at the first performance of Opus 130. The fugue was
such a “Babelic” offence that Beethoven was persuaded to ostracize it from
the quartet and replace it with an “alternative” finale.265 The question today,
however, is no longer hidden behind the aesthetic smokescreen of the first
critics since the fugue’s artistic integrity is no longer in doubt; the issue is now
an ethical one. Structurally, Beethoven has tied the fugue to the Cavatina by
interconnecting the Gs that end the song and initiate the finale. It is as if
Beethoven wanted the audience to think about the juxtaposition, not to impli-
cate the listener but to make conscious what would otherwise remain inarticu-
late within the subject. Although the juxtaposition seemed like nonsense to
the first audience, theologically it makes sense; it is “the formal law of free-
dom” unmasked by the face of the Other.266 As Lévinas suggests: the face of
the Other does not merely command without force, it also tempts the first
crime. Murder is the normative reaction to “the imponderably delicate aura 
of the Other.” And if, as suggested, the Cavatina evokes the suffering gaze of
263. Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, Dialogues and a Diary (London: Faber, 1968), 124.
On Stravinsky’s formalism see Richard Taruskin, “A Myth of the Twentieth Century: The Rite 
of Spring, the Tradition of the New, and ‘The Music Itself,’ ” Modernism/Modernity 2 (1995):
1–26.
264. See note 157.
265. The term “Babel” was actually leveled at the Grosse Fuge. See Anton Felix Schindler,
Beethoven as I Knew Him, ed. Donald W. MacArdle, trans. Constance S. Jolly (London: Faber,
1966), 307.
266. It is apt that both Paul Bekker and J. W. N. Sullivan interpret the Grosse Fuge as a solu-
tion to the question of “freedom and necessity [i.e., law].” Sullivan hears in the fugue the neces-
sity of suffering as a gift to be received. In other words, the formal law of freedom is the freedom
to accept the law that form imposes. See Paul Bekker, Beethoven, trans. M. M. Bozman (London:
Dent, 1925), 332; and J. W. N. Sullivan, Beethoven: His Spiritual Development (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1927), 228–30.
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Christ, then perhaps Adorno is right in assigning the “possibility of pogroms 
. . . [to] the moment when the gaze of a fatally wounded animal falls on a 
human being. The defiance with which he repels this gaze—‘after all, it’s only
an animal’—reappears irresistibly in cruelties done to human beings, the 
perpetrators having again and again to reassure themselves that ‘it is only an 
animal.’ ”267 Our pathological condition of fear means that the truly human
must be purged in order to maintain the sovereignty of the Self. The Grosse
Fuge registers the automatic need to avert the gaze with an aggression that
borders on hubris. Having wrenched the G from the previous cadence,
Beethoven cranks the music chromatically upwards as if the fugue were turn-
ing away from the eyes of the Cavatina. Indeed, Richard Kramer hears this
“horrific G” between the two movements as a “narrative voice” that “brazenly
repudiates” the Cavatina as mere fantasy, “a voice that, in a structural sense,
can be said to supersede the voice that sings the Cavatina.” This voice is an
outside force that takes narrative control of the Other.268 So in one sense, the
Grosse Fuge triumphs by absorbing the Other into itself. But its sheer force is
so disproportionate to the weakness of the gaze that its heroic antics appear
empty. The fugue is an over-reaction, for there is no force to react against, no
cause for Promethean rebellion, no ground for the sublime. In the fraught
question concerning the true finale of this quartet, one can assert with many
commentators that the Cavatina and the Grosse Fuge are inextricable bound;
however, it is not the overwhelming power of the fugue that is the source of
the problem but the Cavatina. In the end, the Grosse Fuge cannot stand fast
against it. It cannot demythologize the gaze. The fugue’s self-destructive ag-
gression betrays the ineradicable stain of the Other which, without standing
firm, has shaken the very core of monadic purity. The transient turns out to be
a permanent irritation. Its infinite patience is “an absolute resistance to posses-
sion.”269 Thus the sad eyes that peer out of the Cavatina with its fragile and
exposed gaze are offered as the most dangerous gift of all, for to face this mu-
sic is to face up to redemption.
267. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 105. For Agamben, the homo sacer is the embodiment of the
logic of exception and exclusion that is the very foundation of Roman sovereignty; for power to
maintain its grip, it must ultimately reduce even what it is self-bound to protect to some quasi-
animal status, a form of bare life that can be killed indifferently. Since the homo sacer cannot be
murdered, executed, or sacrificed under Roman law, he is the illegal exception on which the legal-
ity of sovereignty depends. John Milbank in Being Reconciled, 90–104, extends this idea to Christ;
his death is not dignified, like that of a martyr for a cause; rather “he died the death which any of
us, under sovereign authority, in exceptional circumstances which always prove the rule, may pos-
sibly die. . . . He died the death of us all” (96–97). In this sense, the G that connects the Cavatina
to the Grosse Fuge exposes in theological terms the horrific logic of homo sacer.
268. Kramer, “Between Cavatina and Overture: Opus 130 and the Voices of Narrative,” 181
and 184.
269. Lévinas, Difficult Freedom, 8.
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Abstract
Beethoven’s Promethean image has been reenforced in recent scholarship by
the idea of the “heroic.” Although the escalation of the concept has been rec-
ognized as an act of selective hearing based on a handful of “heroic” works,
Beethoven’s Promethean identity is likely to remain because it embodies the
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ethical values of a particularly virulent strain of humanism; Beethoven is still
employed today to mark the epochal events of human history—from the fall
of the Berlin Wall to the atrocities of 9/11. However, the humanism this hero
champions has been accused as a cause of the very inhumanity the music is
suppose to erase. To offer an alternative is not difficult—there are many works
by the composer that do not conform to the Promethean image; but the alter-
native would be meaningless if it were merely a matter of registering other
topics or narratives without grounding the difference in a set of values that
challenge the ethical force of the hero. This article sketches the possibility of
such an alternative through the ethics of philosophers such as Emmanuel
Lévinas and Theodor W. Adorno. It explores an-Other humanism in
Beethoven both in the sense of an other Beethoven and a humanism founded
on the Other.
Keywords: Ludwig van Beethoven, Theodor W. Adorno, Emmanuel Lévinas,
humanism, ethics
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